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Introduction
The recent financial crisis that originated in the U.S. sub-prime mort-
gage sector elicited a redefinition of the macroeconomic research agenda.
The crisis marked the end of the “Great Moderation”, a period about
20 years long characterized by low volatility in inflation and output.
In this environment, economists grew complacent on their theories
and models.1 The crisis however shattered the profession’s certain-
ties and paved the way to a new strand of research. In particular,
it became clear that in order to make sense of the strong decline
in output that compounded with the turmoil in the financial sector,
economists were to take into account financial frictions seriously in
their models. Specifically, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models, which are the work-horse models in the analysis of
the business cycle, have often been silent on financial aspects before
the crisis, and therefore came under attack from many pundits as not
being able to cope with the complexity of the real economy.
DSGE models are a class of models that analyses the business cycle
by resorting to a general equilibrium approach and relying on the
microfoundations of their characterizing equations. One typical as-
sumption of those models, which has been particularly criticized in
the aftermath of the crisis, is the reduction of the agents populating
the economy to a single representative agent. As noted by Kiyotaki
(2011), rather than an abstraction from heterogeneity, this assump-
tion hides the idea that markets work perfectly smoothly. In par-
ticular, this framework is well carved in the idea that credit flows
without impairments from borrowers to savers.
Critiques towards this class of models and to business cycle theory
sometimes lingered too heavily on their shortcoming, and seldomly
recognized the great deal of efforts that has been put in practice to
distance DSGE from Real Business Cycle (RBC) models. While this
latter research program has been characterized by an over-optimistic
stance towards the efficiency and speed in the adjusting mechanism
of market economies, DSGE models, even prior to the crisis, have
1As an illustartive example, see for example the speech held by Bernanke (2002)
on the occasion of Milton Friedman’s ninetieth birthday.
xbeen modified to consider different sources of frictions.
Indeed, the introduction of nominal and real rigidities as well as the
introduction of collateral constraints for households mark a distinc-
tive departure from the RBC program towards a more realistic ac-
count of the economy. In particular, those achievements have been
reached well before the crisis.2 However, what mainly those models
were missing, and most of them still miss, is a complete integration
of a financial sector and the study of the interaction of financial in-
termediaries and their balance sheet with the global economy.
This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the literature on DSGE
models with financial frictions. In doing so, my research strategy
consists of building on well renowned models in the literature and
to add on them with the dual aim of providing new hindsight and to
enhance the understanding of those models by exploring their theo-
retical underpinnings. The thesis is composed of three chapters. The
first one profits from the contribution of my supervisor Prof. Patrizio
Tirelli, while the second and third chapters are not co-authored. The
three chapters can be read as separated works, with their own ratio-
nale and motivations. However, they are part of a research program
and therefore they share a common ground. In particular, the ele-
ments that make the chapters part of a unitary body are related on
the one hand to the necessity of considering some salient facts of
the financial crisis and on the other hand follow directly from the
modelling strategy adopted. The financial crisis made clear that the
housing sector has a distinctive role in the economy, which singles it
out from other sectors. Housing is not only a durable good, but also
the most important asset in households’ balance sheets3 and under-
standing how its presence affects the propagation of shocks is cru-
cial. In all the models developed in this thesis, housing4 is always
2See for example the financial accelerator mechanism in Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999).
3In the U.S. in the period 1952-2008 housing wealth has been on average 1.5
times the GDP, and housing constitutes more than 50% of households’ wealth in
the U.S.. Furthermore, residential investment is also very volatile and it leads busi-
ness investment Iacoviello (2010).
4Given its theoretical focus, the third chapter does not refer explicitly to housing
but features durable goods that can be thought as representing the housing sector.
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modelled explicitly, having the additional role of working as collat-
eral for borrowers. Heterogeneity, and therefore the departure from
the representative agent model and from the idea that credit circu-
lation is frictionless is taken into account in all the chapters. The
economies considered are indeed characterized by the presence of
savers and borrowers that interact in the credit market and given
intrinsic characteristics of the model economy this gives the rise to
dynamics which are influenced by the balance sheet of agents and
feed back to the rest of the economy.
The reminder of the thesis is structured as follows: in the first
chapter I introduce a distinction between sub-prime borrowers and
ordinary borrowers, investigating the response of the economy to
different shocks. In particular, I focus on the transmission channels of
an unexpected increase in housing investment risk in the sub-prime
sector and of a monetary policy shock. The model features risky
mortgages and a non-trivial banking sector, characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition and therefore sticky loan rates, which in the
context of the model can be seen as a proxy for longer term mortgage
contracts. The dynamics of the model are influenced by financial fric-
tions, which are given by endogenous variations in the balance sheet
of both constrained agents and banks. As a consequence, the results
of our baseline model are given by the interaction and coexistence
of different channels. Borrowers face collateral constraints and run
up nominal debt. As a result, changes in the asset values, i.e. house
prices, and in the inflation rate – Fisher effect – have a direct impact
on households’ borrowing conditions. Binding collateral constraints
are instead affected by changes in the real interest rate. Indeed, an
increase in the cost of the mortgage impairs borrowers’ ability to get
loans. This, combined with the fact that debt is nominal, contributes
to a magnification of shocks. Banks’ balance sheets are instead im-
portant for they influence directly credit conditions and therefore af-
fect the shadow value of borrowing and the loan rate.
In the second chapter I investigate the response of private consump-
tion and output to public consumption shocks and to changes in
taxes. It is well known that in frictionless economies it may be diffi-
cult to rationalize the empirically observed positive or non-significant
xii
response of private consumption to such shocks. The model focuses
on the introduction of a collateral constraint tied to the expected
value of the housing stock for a group of households. The pres-
ence of this kind of financial friction has important consequences
for the transmission of fiscal policy, given that constrained and un-
constrained households reaction to the shock is at odds. The model
designed in this work also allows to compare the effect of a relatively
large menu of taxes on the main macro-aggregates and to study changes
in one of the institutional characteristic of the credit market, namely
the loan-to-value ratio.
The third chapter focuses on a technical aspect of DSGE models with
durable goods. In these models, a co-movement problem between
consumption of durable and non-durable goods arises after a mon-
etary policy shock in presence of flexible durable prices, i.e. a mon-
etary contraction causes an expansion in the durable sector. I re-
visit the debate in the literature on this problem and I try to calrify
what are the necessary elements that those models need to take into
account to avoid a negative correlation between durable and non-
durable goods.
xiii
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1Chapter 1
Sub-prime Mortgages and
Banking in a DSGE Model

3Abstract
This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on DSGE
models with financial frictions by studying the transmission mech-
anism of a shock to housing investment that is confined to a lim-
ited group of constrained households (sub-primers). Financial fric-
tions are not only operating via the borrowers’ balance sheet but also
through changes in banks’ balance sheet. Indeed, on the one hand
the initial shock reverberates through a decline in house prices bring-
ing about a contagion effect that reduces consumption of durable and
non-durable goods of prime borrowers, who are initially immune to
the exogenous shock. On the other hand, the presence of a bank-
ing sector alters the dynamics of the shock via changes in the loan
rates. We claim the following contributions. A shock to a small group
of borrowers, (sub-primers account for less then 4% of total house-
holds) triggers a decline in total output because of endogenous prop-
agation channels. We show that the amplification mechanism works
mainly via house prices and changes in credit conditions. Second,
sticky bank rates, and therefore monopolistic power in the banking
sector amplify the shock. Third, monetary policy has a stronger effect
on sub-primers since being more leveraged, they are more sensitive
to changes in credit conditions. Fourth, if we compare an economy
characterized by frictions on the side of the lenders and an economy
with a frictionless flow of credit from lenders to borrowers the latter
economy is more resilient to a house price shock. Finally, we show
how an increase in the share of sub-primers, a salient fact of the pre-
crisis years, magnifies the size of the initial shock.
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1.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis that hit the U.S. economy and rapidly
spread to the rest of the world had its epicentre in the housing resi-
dential market and it featured sub-prime borrowers as the main pro-
tagonists. The role of the banking sector has also been crucial, for
banks on the one hand have been responsible for the widespread
availability of sub-prime mortgage contracts, and on the other hand
recorded heavy losses on their balance sheet as a consequence of in-
creasing mortgage delinquencies.
The ensuing turmoil in the financial sector led to a tightening in fi-
nancial conditions which made the downturn even more severe and
contributed to the depth of the crisis. Figure 1.1 shows that residen-
tial private investment in the U.S. contracted considerably in the pe-
riod 2006− 2009 and that it was followed by a strong and prolonged
decline in consumption and GDP.
The U.S. economy underwent some major changes in the years run-
ning up to the crisis. A well documented fact, which is likely to be
at the root of the crisis, is the sharp increase in mortgage lending,
that reverberated into a equally large increase in households’ debt
(Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2015). This can be seen in fig-
ure 1.2, which shows the steep increase in households’ leverage in
the 2000s, measured as outstanding mortgages over GDP. Indeed,
in 2003, when the industry was at its peak, the mortgage market ac-
counted for around 25% of U.S. economy – about 4 trillion of U.S. dol-
lars. Those dynamics have been in part shaped and in part reinforced
by the spike in house prices. Although, relative house prices started
to increase already somewhere in the mid-20th century (Knoll, Schu-
larick, and Steger, 2014),1 their rise accelerated in the 2000s. Figure
1.3 shows that in the period the level of mortgages to GDP piled up,
house prices increased by around 60%. Housing is historically one of
the most important form of investment in the U.S. (Tracy, Schneider,
and Chan, 1999), indeed about 2/3 of U.S. households own a house
and housing is the most important asset in their balance sheets, given
that about 50% of their wealth is constituted by their housing stock
1The same authors observe that this phenomenon is not an isolated character-
istic of the U.S. economy, but concerns many other advanced economies.
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(Iacoviello, 2010). It does not surprise then, that the study of the sec-
tor has received considerable attention, even prior to the financial
crisis.
FIGURE 1.1: The U.S. during the Great Recession – Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data – FRED – St. Louis Fed. – Quarterly data of: Real Private
Residential Fixed Investment, Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, and
Real Gross Domestic Product
The growth of the sub-prime market started back in mid 1990s
(Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, 2006).2 However, while be-
tween 1996 and 2003 the sub-prime mortgage market accounted on
average for only 9% of total market, this share more than doubled in
2006, reaching the unprecedented level of 23.5% (see figure 1.4). Be-
fore the unfolding of the crisis, sub-primers default rate was close to
6%, compared to a rate of default of primers lower than 1%. In figure
1.5, we present evidence of the increase in the rate of default, which
gradually climbs by the end of 2006. At its pick in 2009, the rate of
default of sub-primers was about 30%.3 As shown by Mian and Sufi
2The alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act in 1982 is the official starting
date for the sub-prime sector.
3We measure the default rate using the National Delinquency Survey, a publica-
tion of the Mortgage Bankers Association. More precisely, the measure we adopt is
the percent of loans in foreclosure and among those only the seriously delinquent
loans, which are 90 or more days past due.
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(2009), the increase in the default rate on mortgages has been exacer-
bated in areas where the shares of sub-primers was higher, and those
were also the areas where the increase in mortgage credit concen-
trated. It is therefore important to try to understand how a shock
that originates in this market segment affects the rest of the economy
and its transmission channels.
FIGURE 1.2: Mortgage to GDP in the United States
There is no agreed definition of what a sub-prime loan really is.
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2007), sub-
prime is a label attached to a loan by the lender in all the cases in
which a borrower misses some requirements that would allow him
or her to be granted credit without any impairment. Therefore, sub-
prime mortgage contracts are usually characterized by higher rate of
defaults, higher loan to value ratios and higher interest rates than
prime contracts.
Through sub-prime contracts poorer households – who were be-
fore excluded from the market – got their access to credit, despite
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FIGURE 1.3: All-Transactions House Price Index for the United States, Index
2001:Q1=100, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted – Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis.
they had a bad credit history, low credit scores and/or low down-
payments or lack some of the documentation required. However,
Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) showed that the idea that sub-prime
loans were given only to credit impaired borrowers is only a myth,
and that the sub-primer group was composed by borrowers of all
types. One of the reason for this is that sub-prime is a label often at-
tached for some intrinsic characteristics of the loan itself rather than
for the credit condition of the borrower4. As it will become clear in
the following section, this consideration is important for our mod-
elling strategy, considering that we try to model explicitly sub-prime
borrowers and that our modelling strategy does not rest on income
inequality.
In this work we try to build a laboratory that can help us shed
some light on two topics that we believe are strongly intertwined: the
way the presence of sub-primers affects the response of an economy
to shocks and the role played by the financial sector in this process.
4For example, the “2/28 hybrid” mortgage loan is a mortgage contract not usu-
ally sold as a prime loan and therefore only available in the sub-prime market
notwithstanding creditors scores.
8 Chapter 1. Sub-prime Mortgages and Banking in a DSGE Model
We do this by considering a shock to housing investment that only
hits sub-primers and by investigating the effects of a monetary pol-
icy shock in an economy populated by this category of households.
FIGURE 1.4: Share of sub-prime mortgages over the total mortgage market.
Source: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011.
Our modelling strategy follows a well established theoretical ap-
proach, that of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els. The defining equations of this class of models are derived from
first principles and allow us to study the response of an economic
system to a perturbation of its steady state equilibrium. DSGE mod-
els include a number of frictions, that distance this modelling strat-
egy from the neo-classical understanding of the economy – charac-
terized by competitive markets that always clear smoothly. Recent
literature has underlined the importance of financial frictions if we
want to build models that are consistent to empirical facts. In this
paper, we present a model where financial frictions are not only op-
erating via the borrowers balance sheets but also through changes in
banks balance sheet. Indeed, on the one hand the initial shock that
we consider reverberates through a decline in house prices, bring-
ing about a contagion effect that reduces consumption of durable
and non-durable of prime borrowers, who are initially immune to
the exogenous shock. On the other hand, the presence of a bank-
ing sector alters the dynamics of the shock via changes in the loan
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rates. We claim the following contributions. A shock to a small
group of borrowers, (sub-primers account for less than 4% of total
households) triggers a decline in total output because of endoge-
nous propagation channels. We show that the amplification mech-
anism works mainly via house prices and changed credit conditions.
Second, sticky bank rates, and therefore monopolistic power in the
banking sector amplify the shock. This stickiness may also be viewed
as a proxy for fixed-rate mortgage contracts and in case of a mone-
tary policy, however, it plays an attenuating role. Third, monetary
policy has a stronger effect on sub-primers since being more lever-
aged, they are more sensitive to changes in credit conditions. Fourth,
if we compare an economy characterized by frictions on the side of
the lenders and an economy with a frictionless flow of credit from
lenders to borrowers the latter economy is more resilient to a house
price shock. Finally, we show how an increase in the share of sub-
primers, a salient fact of the pre-crisis years, magnifies the size of the
initial shock.
FIGURE 1.5: Delinquency rates by loan type – Seriously Delinquent Loans,
90+ days past due – National Delinquency Survey Data – Mortgage Bankers
Association.
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1.2 Literature Review
The study of the role played by financial frictions over the busi-
ness cycle has always been a fertile avenue of research in economics,
one that has a long stand tradition, stretching back to the contribu-
tion of economists who directly experienced the consequences of the
Great Depression such as Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1936)5. How-
ever, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, a par-
ticular class of models that are now the workhorse for macroeco-
nomic analysis in academia and institutions as well, partly under-
estimated the importance of the sources of financing for firms and
households alike. It is enough to say that many Central Banks around
the world prior to the financial crisis relied on models that did not
even consider explicitly the financial sector6 a symptom of overcon-
fidence on the efficiency of the financial sector hiding the implicit
acceptance of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. The financial crisis
provided new impetus to the analysis of financial frictions and by
creating a vivid example of how financial institutions behavior and
their balance sheet can affect the real economy, it forced scholars to
reconsider the importance of impairments in the circulation of credit.
In particular, while demand-side factors such as the borrowers’ bal-
ance sheet structure were already taken into account before the crisis,
economists now switched their focus on supply-side aspects, namely
on lenders’ balance sheets. It is in the integration of both demand
and supply concerns that our model finds its rationale.
The literature on financial frictions is particularly vast but the
integration of financial frictions into general equilibrium models of
the New-Keynesian types begun only with the seminal contribution
by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (hereafter BGG). The au-
thors built on Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke and Gertler
(1986), and quantified the relevance of balance sheet constraints on
the firms level in determining the propagation and persistence of
5See Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) for an exhaustive survey
on financial frictions.
6Examples are: the SIGMA model at the Federal Reserve, the Smets and
Wouters model at the ECB and the Bank of England’s Quarterly Model (Verona,
Martins, and Drumond, 2013).
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shocks over the business cycle. This approach, goes under the name
of financial accelerator, for it underscores how financial conditions
might magnify the effect of even small shocks. A second important
strand of literature on financial frictions moves along the lines of Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997), and studies the effects on the economy of
introducing collateral constraints based on the presence of durable
goods. It does so by abandoning the representative agent model and
dividing agents into borrowers and savers on the basis of their dif-
ferent discount factor. Nested in this strand of research are DSGE
models featuring housing, a particular form of durable goods that
on the one hand enter in the utility function and on the other allow
a class of agents in the model (relatively high impatient borrowers)
to use their value as a collateral against which to borrow. Important
contributions in this area are given by Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) who estimated a New-Keynesian model with hous-
ing for the U.S. economy. In the two papers, the authors find that
collateral constraints and nominal debt change the dynamics of a
DSGE model and that the volatility of housing investment is mainly
explained by housing demand and technology shock. Calza, Mona-
celli, and Stracca (2013) analyzed the way institutional factors affect
the response of an economy featuring housing used as a collateral to
a monetary shock. According to their findings, economies which are
characterized by higher loan to values and flexible mortgage rates
are less resilient to a monetary shock. Following the work done by
Forlati and Lambertini (2011) (hereafter FL) we are able to take into
account both strands of research. FL transfer the agency problem
used by BGG to characterize entrepreneurs to the household side.
The agency problem is built on the riskiness of housing investment,
on households’ defaulting possibilities and on the fact that the out-
come of the investment is private information of borrowers. As in
BGG, FL use the Costly State Verification approach, pioneered by
Townsend (1979), which entails the presence of monitoring costs µ if
borrowers wish to verify the outcome of the investment. The pres-
ence of monitoring costs gives the rise to a debt contract character-
ized by a risk premium and an endogenous loan to value ratio (LTV).
The framework of FL has been used by Pataracchia et al. (2013), who
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included the endogenous LTV approach in a large policy model es-
timated on the Euro Area (QUEST 3) and underlined how the use of
this approach improves the fit of the model.
We build on FL but we extend their model on several dimensions: to
begin with, we add frictions in the price adjustment mechanism of
wages and housing investment, then we move forward and model
explicitly sub-primer borrowers. Our model features therefore three
types of households: unconstrained savers and constrained primers
and sub-primers. We ask then what is the response of the economy to
a shock in the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic investment risk
and to a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, we study the effect of
the introduction of a non trivial banking sector characterized by mar-
ket power and sticky bank rates. To the best of our knowledge we are
among the firsts to include sub-prime borrowers into a DSGE model.
In an recent paper, Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2016) intro-
duce sub-primer borrowers and they distinguish them from primers
on the basis of their income level, their modelling strategy allows
them to theoretically make sense of the evidence that areas charac-
terized by a higher share of sub-prime contracts were also charac-
terized by higher credit growth and higher house prices. Grodecka
(2016) considers also sub-prime borrowers in a DSGE model, and
does so by distinguishing them from primers for the latter get mort-
gage contracts with a fixed rate while the former can only get mort-
gage contracts characterized by flexible interest rates. Her findings
are that sub-primers play a disturbing role for they amplify the effect
of shocks to the economy. Our modelling strategy is different from
both approaches and it rests on the assumption that sub-primeers
and primers have a different attitude towards defaults, and there-
fore sub-primer mortgage contracts are characterized by higher LTV
ratios and higher spreads. We explain our approach in details in the
next section.
Another main strand of literature we are indebted to is the one
that flourished after the financial crisis and started to formally con-
sider supply-side financial frictions by modelling banks explicitly.
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This literature is a response to the critiques moved to DSGE mod-
els to their inability to warn for the upcoming crisis.7 In particular,
this work builds on Gerali et al. (2010) (hereafter GNSS) for the mod-
elling of the banking sector. In that paper the authors added a mech-
anism through which the capitalization of the banking sector affects
the level of the interest rate in the economy, and further introduced
stickiness in banks rates. Those two factors have an effect for the dy-
namics of the model in the economy. In our approach they become
interesting for they interact with the frictions on the borrowers’ side
and affect households default rates.
Several authors have tried to incorporate financial frictions on the
side of financial intermediaries using different approaches. Gertler
and Karadi (2011), for example, introduced a standard agency prob-
lem between borrowers and lenders, which imposes a constraint on
the bank rather than on the final borrower. The constraint creates a
wedge between the cost of external finance and the opportunity cost
of financing an activity with bank’s internal resources. This wedge
affects borrowers’ final credit conditions. The counter-cyclicality of
this wedge derives from the balance sheet of the bank and it is key in
unraveling the crisis as it increases the cost of credit when a negative
shock hits the economy. A positive evolution of economic conditions,
instead, improves the balance sheet of the bank, reducing the exter-
nal cost of finance and ultimately the cost of credit. Hence, the finan-
cial accelerator mechanism in this framework works via the banks’
net worth. The authors used this framework, which can be intro-
duced in a standard DSGE model without increasing much its com-
plexity, to study the effect of unconventional monetary responses.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) proposed a model along the lines of Gertler
and Karadi (2011), however recognizing that a salient aspect of the
financial crisis has been the freeze in the inter-bank market and in-
troducing a mechanism to model idiosyncratic shock affecting the
liquidity of different banks. In order to do so, they introduce an ex-
ogenous shock in banks’ capital quality which finds its empirical jus-
tification from the losses in mortgage baked securities held by banks
after the collapse in house prices. The deterioration in the asset value
7For a strong critique to the DSGE approach see Stiglitz (2011)
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affects the net worth of the bank in proportion to its leverage. Ac-
cording to (Adrian, Colla, and Shin, 2012) a limitation of this work is
in the fact that although the two authors are able to talk about the role
of banking sector in business cycle fluctuations they are silent on pro-
cyclicality of leverage, which as Adrian and Shin (2014) have shown
increases during a boom and decreases in a bust. In a more recent
paper, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2013) add the possibility of bank runs
to their previous model. Building on the seminal work by Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), they allow for an equilibrium in which bank runs
are possible. This event is the result of averse macroeconomic con-
ditions that affect two key variables: banks’ balance sheet and the
liquidation price of assets, which is endogenously determined. In
other words, a bank run equilibrium is possible when the liquidation
value of bank assets falls below its liabilities. A high leverage and a
low liquidation price, which depends on economic activity, are key in
determining the bank run scenario. Using this approach the authors
are able to build a framework which takes into account both the role
of financial frictions in hindering economic activity via an increase in
the spread between fundable loans and deposits, and the possibility
of bank runs. Boissay, Collard, and Smets (2012) presented another
interesting model, accounting for an heterogeneous and non-trivial
banking sector. The authors, introduced a moral hazard problem,
which might lead to a freeze in the interbank market with repercus-
sions for the real economy. The main contribution of the paper is to
allow for the possibility that a financial crisis is the result of small
shocks in productivity, and not of a big negative shock.
1.3 The Model Economy
1.3.1 Mortgage Defaults
The starting point to discuss households’ defaulting possibilities is
to consider the put option component of the mortgage (Bajari, Chu,
and Park, 2008). Consider a frictionless economy, absent any de-
faulting costs, borrowers would default when the present value of
their asset (the house) is lower than the outstanding value of their
debt (the mortgage). This is the implicit assumption behind many
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of the models that consider endogenous default possibilities and it
is sometimes referred to in the literature as the “ruthless defaulting
condition”. However, the literature on mortgage defaults points both
at the presence of additional costs of defaulting and to motives that
might abstract from pure economic reasons. Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2013) show that not only pecuniary motives, but also con-
siderations related to fairness and morality play a role in determining
defaulting decision. Furthermore, they argue that being exposed to
strategic defaulters increases the chances of behaving similarly. The
presence of further components affecting the decisional problem of
homeowners justifies the idea of the so-called negative equity con-
dition, which tells that homeowners will default when the level of
their equity (housing) is strictly negative and sometimes the differ-
ence between the current value of their housing and the value of the
mortgage they have to pay back is quite large. It does not surprise
then, that a large body of literature tried to estimate how negative
the “negative equity” actually is. Indeed, Foote, Gerardi, and Willen
(2008) show that in the recession of 1990-1991 in Massachusetts only
6.4% of homeowners decided to default even if they were in a neg-
ative equity position. Independently from the particular level of the
threshold below which borrowers prefer to default, defaulting is con-
sidered strategic when reaching a particular level of negative equity
the homeowners would still be able to repay his or her loan but
rather prefers to default. According to our approach, all defaults,
being them coming from primers or sub-primers, are strategic, the
difference being that we design a financial contract that allows sub-
primers to exercise the put option as long as their housing value falls
below the mortgage repayment, while primers exercise the option at
a lower threshold.8
In our approach we do not aim at describing with extreme realism
this decision. However, by allowing sub-prime borrowers to default
8In our approach we do not consider an important aspect highlighted in the
literature which affects homeowners decisions to default, that of liquidity con-
straints, derived from idiosyncratic shocks to homeowners’ income – Foote, Ger-
ardi, and Willen (2008) call the joint combination of a negative equity and liquidity
shocks the double trigger hypothesis. However, we do allow for the possibility of
an idiosyncratic shock to the value of housing investment, which somehow ren-
ders the idea of an income shock.
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on the basis of a utility-based approach we explicitly refer to the idea
of strategic default. Furthermore, following the findings of those
studies, we introduce an exogenous component that we call stigma,
which is added to the defaulting condition. By taking on a positive
value for primers, this component ensures that their rate of default in
steady state is lower than that of sub-primers. The stigma component
is a catchall variable, a short cut that we take in order to consider all
the motives which attenuate home-owners willingness to default.
Introducing strategic default option in a DSGE framework allows us
to have a clear separation between two distinct classes of borrowers
with the advantage of rendering some key aspects of the mortgage
market, such as the different LTV ratios, different risk premia and
default rates.
1.3.2 An overview of the model
The model economy is composed by three categories of households
(savers, prime and sub-prime borrowers), by banks and firms, which
are owned by savers and by unions.
There is a continuum of households over the [0,1] interval, and each
household is composed by a large number of members. Households
groups share the same utility function which comprises, a part from
consumption, an aggregate non-durable good – housing – and labor
services. We follow FL assuming that housing investment, for each
single household member, is subject to an idiosyncratic shock ωιt af-
fecting its final value, and allowing borrowers to default, though one
first important novelty of our approach is to explicitly model primers
and sub-primers separately. The idiosyncratic shock is private infor-
mation of the investor and it is assumed to be independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across members of the same household
and across time. In particular, ωt follows a log normal distribution
with p.d.f equal to ft(ωt) and cumulative distribution function equal
to Ft(ωt)9. Furthermore, its expected value is Et(ωt) = 1 at all time
for each households in each group. This means that there is no aggre-
gate risk in housing investment at the household level. This reason,
9We follow BGG by imposing a restriction on the hazard rate h(ω) = F. (ω)1−F (ω) .
Namely that: ∂ωh(ω)∂ω > 0
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coupled with the fact that savers do not borrow and therefore never
default, suffices to ignore the effect of the shock on savers.
All households members in the prime and sub-prime group are ex-
ante identical. When members are required to pay back their loan
they can decide to default strategically. We assume that there is per-
fect insurance among household members so that consumption of
non-durable goods and housing services are ex post equal across all
members of the household. Hence, borrower household members
are also ex post identical.
The riskiness of housing investment changes over time through a
change in the standard deviation σω,t of the shocks’ distribution. The
idiosyncratic shock is private information of the household member
and to observe it the lender must pay an auditing cost that is a fixed
proportion µ of the realized housing stock value. This constitutes an
agency problem that introduces a first financial friction in the model
since borrowers are endogenously constrained in the amount they
can borrow from banks. The presence of an agency problem between
borrowers and lenders allows us to endogenize the constraint and to
introduce a risk premium in a way similar to the problem developed
by BGG. As explained by FL, the shock can be thought as a shock
to the investment itself or as a shock to the price of houses, given
by geographical differences. Considering the nature of the shock,
which displays an unchanged mean productivity of housing invest-
ment, we can also think about it as an increase in uncertainty that
endogenously triggers a higher number of defaults in the housing
sector (Pataracchia et al., 2013). Finally, as noted by Demyanyk and
Hemert (2011), the quality of loans considerably deteriorated during
the 6 years before the financial crisis, therefore we can also interpret
the shock to the standard deviation as a way to reproduce this dete-
rioration of loans in the sub-prime sector.
Banks collect deposits from savers and lend to impatient house-
holds. Lending assumes the form of a one period contract, where
a state-contingent contractual interest rate rkt is paid each period by
non defaulting borrowers to ensure that the banks get a safe return
(rlt), therefore the risk is entirely borne by borrowers. If a household’s
member decides to default the bank can seize the housing stock of
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the agent, after having paid the monitoring cost. Banks are subject
to an optimal leverage ratio, which can be thought as arising from
regulatory requirements as for example the Basel framework on cap-
ital adequacy. In deviating from that optimal level, the bank incurs
into a cost, that endogenously pushes the bank to get back to the op-
timal level of leverage. The deviation of the bank from the optimal
level reduces banks’s margins and exacerbates its capital position,
entailing a reduction of the loan rate, which moves sluggishly given
monopolistic competition in the bank market.
1.4 Households
Imagine an economy populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived
households distributed over the [0, 1] interval, each household being
composed by a large number of members. Households are identical
but for their rate of time preference. A fraction ξ is impatient while
the remaining fraction (1 − ξ) is composed by patient individuals.
That leads patient households to lend to impatient ones, therefore
we can also refer to those two groups indistinctly as savers (s) and
borrowers (b).
Households enjoy utility from consumption of non-durable goods
(Ct) and from housing (Ht), while they receive disutility from labor
efforts (Nt). They maximize their life-time utility with respect to
housing and consumption while they delegate to unions wage set-
ting decisions and therefore they do not maximize utility also with
respect to labor efforts. We use an utility function of this form:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtı
(
ln Xt − ζı
∑
m=c,h
N
(1+η)
m,t
(1 + η)
)
, with ı = (b, s) 0 < βı < 1 (1.1)
where Xt is as an index of housing and non-durable goods:
Xt ≡ [(1− α)(Ct − bhCt−1)
(χ−1)
χ + αH
(χ−1)
χ
t ]
χ
(χ−1)
and βts > βtb – that is, savers discount the future less heavily than
borrowers. The parameters α > 0 and ζ > 0 represent respectively
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the share of housing in the composite index and are the weight of
housing and labor in the utility function. η is the inverse of the
wage elasticity of labor supply and we allow for external habit in
consumption, driven by the parameter bh. Finally, working hours are
indexed since we consider two separate sectors: consumption (c) and
housing (h).10 We introduce a further element of heterogeneity in the
model by identifying a fraction ϑ of borrowers as what we call prime
borrowers, and the remaining (1 − ϑ) as sub-primers. Borrowers
b = (p, s-p) enjoy the same discount factor, and their distinction rests
on their different attitude towards defaulting. While sub-primers
take defaulting decisions following a ruthless negative equity condi-
tion, primers attach a relatively higher value to their housing hold-
ings. Borrowers are constrained in the amount they can borrow by
the value of their collateral, which in this model is represented by
their housing stock. The constraint is endogenously determined and
its size originates from an agency problem between borrowers and
lenders. We describe in detail this problem and the financial contract
that it generates separately for sub-primers and primers.
1.4.1 Sub-prime Borrowers
Sub-primers follow a simple defaulting rule – namely they exercise
the put-option of the mortgage contract following a ruthless default-
ing condition. More precisely a sub-primer ι defaults whenever the
value of her loan (mortgage) is higher than the present value of her
housing stock:
(1.2)ωι,s−pt+1 H
ι,s−p
t Ph,t+1(1− δ) ≤ Lι,s−pt (1 + rk,s−pt+1 )
where Ph is house nominal price, δ is the housing depreciation rate
and Ls−pt the size of the loan. Note the timing in this equation. The
borrower decides Hs−pt and L
s−p
t at time t. At the beginning of t + 1
the shock hits her housing stock. She compares the value of her hous-
ing stock with the cost of the mortgage, which is given by rk,s−pt+1 and
decides consequently whether to default or not. After the idiosyn-
cratic shock hits the housing sector, some households’ members will
10We kept the utility function as generic as possible, Appendix A contains a de-
tailed description of the form taken by the utility function relative to the parame-
ters chosen.
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default, while the rest shall prefer to fulfill their obligations. We
can therefore identify a threshold value for ωt+1, which we call ω¯t+1.
Households’ members whose investment value happens to be below
this threshold shall prefer to default:
(1.3)ω¯s−pt+1H
s−p
t Ph,t+1(1− δ) = Ls−pt (1 + rk,s−pt+1 )
Therefore, ω¯t+1 is an endogenous threshold determining the share of
households that will default on their obligations.
Banks, collect deposits and agree to pay back a risk free interest rate
rdt on them, which in this model corresponds to the policy rate. Fol-
lowing GNSS we distinguish banks into a retail and a wholesale
branch. The wholesale branch operates in a perfectly competitive
market, it collects deposits and issues loans, which are then passed
to the retail branch at the interbank rate rintt . Banks in the retail sec-
tor operates in a monopolistic competitive market, this results in a
loan rate rlt set as a mark-up over the interbank rate. Banks’ return
is predetermined, namely the rate rlt is agreed at time t and paid in
the following period, notwithstanding contingencies. Again, let us
remind that this assumption entails that the risk is borne by borrow-
ers only. However, this does not rule out the possibility for bank to
suffer a reduction in profits therefore reducing their net worth. Tak-
ing this into account we can write the participation constraint for the
bank as:
(1.4)
(1 + rlt)L
s−p
t =
∫ ω¯s−pt+1
0
ωt+1(1− µ)(1− δ)Ph,t+1Hs−pt ft+1(ω) dω
+
∫ ∞
ω¯s−pt+1
(1 + rk,s−pt+1 )L
s−p
t ft+1(ω) dω
The participation constraint reads as follow: the value of the hous-
ing stock being seized by banks combined with the value of the loans
paid back by non-defaulters (right hand side of (1.4)) must be equal
to the pre-determined return on loans (1 + rlt)L
s−p
t . Note that this
equation does not hold in expectations, but it is always satisfied.
This is possible because the rate paid on mortgages rk,s−pt+1 adjusts
as to satisfy the constraint at any point in time. That means that
in this model we are assuming that mortgage contracts last only one
period and feature adjustable rates.However, the presence of sticky
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bank rates might be seen as a modelling shortcut that allows to think
to mortgage contracts as featuring fixed rates, at least to some ex-
tent. We have all the elements we need to identify the financial con-
tract between borrowers and lenders. The contract is identified by
an amount of lending Ls−pt and a mortgage rate r
k,s−p
t+1 . Given the dis-
tribution of the shock and households housing stock, the choice of
those two variables pins down the default threshold and therefore
households’ defaulting rate. Therefore, it is convenient to identify
the financial contract with the couple (Ls−pt , ω¯
s−p
t+1 ). Given this specifi-
cation, we can simplify the borrower problem by using some defini-
tions. Let:
(1.5)Gt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 ) ≡
∫ ω¯s−pt+1
0
ωt+1ft+1(ω) dω
be the share of defaulters’s housing stock that the bank expects to
seize, gross of monitoring costs, and:
(1.6)Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 ) ≡ ω¯s−pt+1
∫ ∞
ω¯s−pt+1
ft+1(ω)dω +Gt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )
be the total expected share of the housing value that would go to
the bank gross of monitoring costs. Using the above definitions and
plugging (1.3) into (1.4) we can rewrite the participation constraints
expressing everything in terms of the housing stock, and getting rid
of the contractual rate rk,s−pt+1 :
(1.7)(1 + rlt)L
s−p
t = [Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )− µGt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )](1− δ)Ph,t+1Hs−pt
where
(1.8)[Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )− µGt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )]
is the loan to value ratio, that measures the size of the loans the
sub-primers can get compared to the value of the housing stock. We
can also read the loan to value ratio as the share of the housing stock
that goes to lenders in return of their lending activity. The loan to
value is an increasing function in ω¯ meaning that a higher default
rate goes hand in hand with an increase in the contractual rate rk
and therefore in the repayment to the lender. Now, we can rewrite
(1.7) in real terms by dividing everything for Pc,t:
(1.9)(1 + rlt)l
s−p
t = [Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )− µGt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )](1− δ)ph,t+1Hs−pt pit+1
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In order to write down the households’ budget constraint we
need to determine the housing stock that households are left with
at time t:
(1.10)
∫ ∞
ω¯s−pt
ωt(1− δ)Hs−pt−1 Ph,tft(ω) dω = [1−Gt(ω¯s−pt )](1− δ)Hs−pt−1 Ph,t
we can write this using the fact that Et(ω) = 1, namely:
Et(ωt) =
∫ ∞
0
ωtft(ω)dωft = 1
=
∫ ω¯s−pt
0
ωtft(ω)dωft +
∫ ∞
ω¯s−pt
ωtft(ω)dωft = 1
and therefore:
(1.11)
∫ ∞
ω¯s−pt
ωtft(ω)dωft = [1−Gt(ω¯s−pt )]
We can now write the budget constraint in nominal terms:
(1.12)
Cs−pt Pc,t + Ph,tH
s−p
t + L
s−p
t−1 (1 + r
k
t )[1− Ft(ω¯s−pt )]
= Ls−pt + (1− δ)[1−Gt(ω¯s−pt )]Ph,tHs−pt−1 +
∑
m
W s−pm,t N
s−p
m,t
Now we can use the relationship in (1.3) and in (1.7) as shown in
Appendix A to eliminate rk,s−pt , and also rewrite it in real terms:11
Cs−pt + ph,tH
s−p
t +
ls−pt−1
pit
(1 + rlt−1) = l
s−p
t +(1−δ)[1−µGt(ω¯s−pt )]ph,tHs−pt−1
+
∑
m
ws−pm,tN
s−p
m,t
(1.13)
The sub-primer maximizes (1.1) with respect to Cs−pt , H
s−p
t , l
s−p
t
and ω¯s−pt+1 subject to the budget constraint (1.13) and the participation
constraint (1.9).
The first order condition with respect to Cs−pt equates marginal
utility from consumption MU s−pc,t with the Lagrange multiplier from
the budget constraint12:
(1.14)MU s−pc,t = λ
s−p
t
11See Appendix A for details.
12Details of the problem can be found in the Appendix A
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The first order condition with respect to Hs−pt defines the investment
decision in the housing sector:
(1.15)λ
s−p
t ph,t = MU
s−p
h,t + (1− δ)βbEt[(1− µGt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 ))λs−pt+1ph,t+1
+ γs−pt+1 [Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )− µGt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )]ph,t+1pit+1]
where MUh,t is the marginal utility from housing services. Equa-
tion (1.15) deserves a closer scrutiny. This condition requires that
the marginal gain from consumption equals the marginal gain from
housing. That is not only given by the marginal utility of housing
but also from the fact that housing can be sold in the next period and
used to buy an additional unit of consumption and by the fact that it
can be used as a collateral (latter term on the right).
The first order condition with respect to ls−pt is given by:
(1.16)λs−pt − (1 + rlt)Et
[
λs−pt+1
pit+1
βb + γ
s−p
t+1
]
= 0
where γs−pt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier of the participation con-
straint. This equation also reads as the Euler equation for savers and
it states that the marginal utility from consumption today is higher
than the marginal utility from consumption tomorrow when the con-
straint is binding (γs−pt+1 > 0).
Finally, we have the first order condition with respect to the de-
faulting threshold:
(1.17)−λs−pt+1βbµG′t+1(ω¯s−pt+1 ) + γs−pt+1 [Γ′t+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )− µG′t+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )]pit+1 = 0
Note that this condition is not expressed in expectations since ω¯t+1
always adjust to ensure that the participation constraint (1.9) always
holds with equality.
This condition equates the marginal gain from a small increment
in the defaulting threshold and the additional cost of defaulting. The
former is given by the increase in the loan to value ratio, and it is big-
ger the higher is γs−pt+1 , namely the more the borrower is constrained.
The latter is given by the marginal increase in the resources wasted
by a higher rate of default. Indeed, µG(ω¯s−pt+1 ) is the amount of moni-
toring costs, which in this set-up are de iure paid by the lender, but de
facto paid by borrowers.
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1.4.2 Prime Borrowers
The maximization problem and the financial contract designed for
primer borrowers is similar to the one outlined for sub-primers in
the previous section. However, the default for this class of borrowers
is less likely to happen. Formally we model this condition by adding
a stigma component to the defaulting condition of primers which is
proportional to the value of the housing stock. The stigma compo-
nent is a catchall variable that summarizes non-economic motives
that lie behind borrowers’ decision to default. Namely, by adding
this further component in the defaulting condition of primers, we
are assuming that primers are more attached to their housing stock
and that they value it more than sub-primers. This translates, ceteris
paribus, into a lower default threshold, and therefore into a lower
contractual rate.13
For a single primer ι the defaulting condition might be written as:
(1.18)ωι,pt+1H
p
t Ph,t+1(1− δ) + (stigma)Hpt Ph,t+1(1− δ) ≤ Lι,pt (1 + rk,pt+1)
Following the sub-primer problem we can now identify a thresh-
old value for ωι,pt+1:
(1.19)(ω¯pt+1 + stigma)H
p
t Ph,t+1(1− δ) = Lpt (1 + rk,pt+1)
Equation (1.19) suggests that ceteris paribus primers’ default will
be less likely than that of sub-primers since the way we introduced
the stigma component works as a positive component that increases
the value of primers’ housing stock. Indeed, this is exactly the mean-
ing that we want to attach to this variable, given that some house-
holds do not consider only economic reasons when they have to de-
cide whether to leave their home or keep on paying their mortgages
even though the value of their house fell below that of the mortgage
payment.
As we shall show in the next section, the threshold chosen by primers
is going to be lower than that of sub-primers for the reasons ex-
plained above. This would in turn entail a lower contractual rate
on the mortgage rk,pt+1 and a lower loan to value ratio, given that the
13Note that one can also think of sub-primers as primers with a stigma compo-
nent equal to zero.
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latter one is increasing in ω¯t and r
k,p
t .
The analysis of the primer’s problem follows closely the one we al-
ready developed for the sub-primer. By plugging (1.19) into the par-
ticipation constraint:
(1.20)
(1 + rlt)L
p
t =
∫ ω¯pt+1
0
ωt+1(1− µ)(1− δ)Ph,t+1Hpt ft+1(ω) dω
+
∫ ∞
ω¯pt+1
(1 + rk,pt+1)L
p
tft+1(ω) dω
we get the partecipation constraint in real terms:
(1.21)(1 + r
f
t )l
b
t = {Γt+1(ω¯bt+1)− µGt+1(ω¯bt+1)
+ [1− Ft+1(ω¯bt+1)](stigma)}(1− δ)ph,t+1Hbtpit+1
Primers maximize the utility function (1.1) subject to the follow-
ing budget constraint:
(1.22)
Cpt Pc,t + Ph,tH
p
t + L
p
t−1(1 + r
k
t )[1− Ft(ω¯pt )]
= Lpt + (1− δ)[1−Gt(ω¯pt )]Ph,tHpt−1 +
∑
m
Wm,tN
p
m,t
which in real terms is equal to:
(1.23)
Cpt + ph,tH
p
t +
lpt−1
pit
(1 + rlt−1) = l
p
t + (1− δ)[1−µGt(ω¯pt )]ph,tHpt−1
+
∑
m
wm,tN
p
m,t
and to the lender participation constraint (1.21). The first order
condition with respect to Cpt is identical to the one obtained for the
sub-primer, and it defines the Lagrange multiplier of the budget con-
straint:
(1.24)MUpc,t = λ
p
t
Differentiating with respect of Hpt we obtain the housing invest-
ment demand which is also similar to that derived above for the sub-
primer:
MUh,t = λ
b
tph,t
− (1− δ)βbEt{(1− µGt+1(ω¯bt+1))λbt+1ph,t+1 + γbt+1[Γt+1(ω¯bt+1)
− µGt+1(ω¯bt+1) + [1− Ft+1](ω¯bt+1)(stigmab)]ph,t+1pit+1}
(1.25)
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By differentiating with respect of lpt we obtain:
(1.26)λpt − (1 + rlt)Et
[
λpt+1
pit+1
βb + γ
p
t+1
]
= 0
where γpt+1 is the Lagrange multiplier of the participation con-
straint for the primer group of households. This condition is the Eu-
ler equation for primers, and it differs from a standard Euler equa-
tion for the presence of γpt+1. Finally, the first order condition with
respect to ω¯pt+1 differs significantly form the sub-primer problem as it
comprises the stigma component. It is this condition that determines
a lower optimal threshold.
(1.27)−λ
p
t+1βbµG
′
t+1(ω¯
p
t+1) + γ
p
t+[Γ
′
t+1(ω¯
p
t+1)
− µG′t+1(ω¯pt+1)− ft+1(ω¯pt+1)(stigma)]pit+1 = 0
1.4.3 Differences between primers and sub-primers
The defaulting condition for the primer is ceteris paribus lower than
that of the sub-primer. This comes from our definition of the prob-
lem, namely from the introduction of the stigma component, and di-
rectly feeds into the loan to value equation, which hints a lower loan
to value ratio for primers. Indeed, consider two different households
with the same level of housing stock contracting the same nominal
debt. If we set the stigma component to zero for one of the two
households – the sub-primer – and we allow stigma > 0 for primers
we get that for the same realization of the idiosyncratic shock the
primer will attach a higher value to the housing stock:
(1.28)(ωι,pt+1 + stigma)HtPh,t+1(1− δ) ≤ Lιt(1 + rkt+1)
(1.29)ωι,s−pt+1 HtPh,t+1(1− δ) ≤ Lιt(1 + rkt+1)
Therefore the defaulting threshold of the primer will be lower
than that of the sub-primer and it will be determined by the size of
the stigma component, namely we have that: ω¯pt+1 < ω¯
s−p
t+1 .
The decision of a lower threshold is endogenously determined once
we allow primers defaulting condition to be disturbed by the stigma
component. Consider now that the loan to value is increasing in ω¯14,
14Look at Appendix A in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and to our Ap-
pendix A for an in depth explanation.
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but as we have shown above ω¯ is decreasing in stigma. Therefore,
being stigma equal to zero for sub-primers and strictly positive for
primers, the loan to value ratio is ceteris paribus lower for the latter
group of households. Figure 1.6 might help providing an intuition
for the role played by the stigma component. While the true produc-
tivity of housing investment stays unchanged, the presence of stigma
shifts to the left the threshold for primers, who can be thought as
perceiving a higher productivity for their housing investment.
FIGURE 1.6: The log-normal distribution and an example of two different
thresholds . As an illustrative example we plot in blue a hypothetical threshold
for prime borrowers while in red one for sub-primers. A higher threshold is
associated with a higher share of defaulters.
It is important to highlight that in this framework borrowers de-
cide the defaulting threshold, which implicitly means that they de-
fine the contractual rate on their loans. This also means that a dif-
ferent ω¯ for the two groups also implies a different contactual rate.
Namely, a lower threshold for primers entails that in steady state:
(1.30)rk,s−pt > r
k,p
t
1.4.4 Savers
The problem of savers – that we denote with a ∼ is standard. They
maximize (1.1) over C˜t, H˜t and d˜t subject to the following budget
constraint defined in real terms:
(1.31)C˜t + ph,t[H˜t − H˜t−1(1− δ)] + d˜t = d˜t−1(1 + r
d
t−1)
pit
+ w˜tN˜t + Π
fi
t
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where dt is real deposits and rdt the risk free rate earned on de-
posits and Πfit are profits rebated from firms and the banking sector.
The first order condition with respect to C˜t defines the Lagrange
multiplier:
(1.32)M˜U c,t = λ˜c,t
while that on H˜t defines housing investment. Notice that, differ-
ently from what we saw above this decision is only constrained by
the budget constraint:
(1.33)λ˜c,tph,t = M˜Uh,t + β(1− δ)Et[ph,t+1λ˜t+1]
Finally, the first order condition with respect to d˜t is given by a
standard Euler Equation:
(1.34)λ˜t = λ˜t+1β
(1 + rdt )
pit+1
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1.5 The Supply Side
The supply side of the economy is composed by final goods produc-
ers, an intermediate goods sector and labor unions. Furthermore, we
can distinguish between two macro-sectors m = (c, h), namely, the
durable and non-durable sector of the economy. The two sectors will
differ for the calibration and for the different degree of price sticki-
ness. In particular, as highlighted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010), it
seems implausible that house prices are sticky, for they are usually
negotiated between buyer and seller15.
1.5.1 Final Goods Producers
We assume that a continuum of perfectly competitive firms produces
the final good using a CES technology of this form:
(1.35)Ym,t =
(∫ 1
0
Ym,t(i)
εm−1
εm di
) εm
εm−1
where i ∈ [0, 1] is the good produced by the intermediate goods
producer firm i. Following the producer maximization problem we
can derive the demand for intermediate goods:
(1.36)Ym,t(i) =
(
Pm,t(i)
Pm,t
)−εm
Ym,t
and the price index16:
(1.37)Pm,t =
(∫ 1
0
Pm,t(i)
1−εm
) 1
1−εm
di
1.5.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
A measure i ∈ [0, 1] of intermediate goods producers operates un-
der monopolistic competition. Firms readjust their prices following
a Rotemberg mechanism.
The production function in the intermediate sector is represented
by:
(1.38)Ym,t(i) = Am,tNm,t(i)
15For further comments and analysis on this see Chapter III
16See the Appendix A for details.
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where Nt(i) is labor hours and At is an idiosyncratic productivity
parameter.
Monopolistic firms face quadratic costs of adjusting prices:
(1.39)ADJ_Pt(i) =
γm
2
(
Pm,t(i)
Pm,t−1(i)
− 1
)2
Ym,t
Notice that the costs increase in the scale of final output Ym,t.
We can write the maximization problem of the firm under this
setting. Firms take the price level Pm,t, the nominal wage Wm,t and
the aggregate level of output Ym,t as given. They maximize profits
over Nm,t(i) and Pm,t(i):
(1.40)
max
Pm,t(i),Nm,t(i)
Et
∞∑
k =0
Λt,t+k
[
Pm,t(i)Ym,t+k(i)−Wm,t+kNm,t+k(i)
− γm,t
2
(
Pm,t(i)
Pm,t−1(i)
− 1
)2
Pm,tYm,t
]
given the demand and the production function:
(1.41)Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
Yt; Yt(i)
= AtNt(i)
and where the discount factor Λt,t+k is the one of savers for they
own intermediate goods producers.
In a symmetric equilibrium Pm,t(i)
Pm,t
= 1, meaning that all the firms
set the same price and also employ the same amount of labor Nm,t.
First order conditions with respect to Nm,t(i) yield:
(1.42)
Wm,t
Am,t
= MCNm,t(i)
where the superscript N stands for nominal. This condition sug-
gests that nominal marginal costs are given by the ratio of the nomi-
nal wage over the marginal product of labor.
The FOC w.r.t. Pt(i), considering gross inflation as usual as:
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(1.43)pim,t =
Pm,t
Pm,t−1
is equal to:
(1− εm) + εmmcm,t = γm,t(pim,t − 1)pim,t
− γm,tEt
[
Λt+1
Λt
Pm,t+1
Pm,t
Ym,t+1
Ym,t
(pim,t+1 − 1)pim,t+1
]
(1.44)
Equation (1.44) is the New-Keynesian Philips Curve.
In order to introduce housing construction adjustment costs we
follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010). In the paper, the authors argue
that adjustment costs in housing investment is a necessary compo-
nent in the model in order to reconcile the behavior of housing with
the evidence suggested by data. In particular, if the model features
wage stickiness, housing is very sensitive to a monetary policy shock.
Introducing adjustment costs attenuates this sensitivity. Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2010) introduce firm-level adjusting cost separating be-
tween the cost that a firm faces in adjusting the level of production
and the cost the firm faces in changing the production level. Those
are respectively:
(1.45)Costs adjusting the level = Ph,tφh1
Yh,ss
2
(
Yh,t − Yh,ss
Yh,ss
)2
Costs changing the production level = Ph,tφh2
Yh,ss
2
(
Yh,t − Yh,t−1
Yh,ss
)2
(1.46)
Technically, introducing those costs changes the maximization prob-
lem of intermediate firms, equation (1.40) becomes:
max
Pm,t(i),Nm,t(i)
Et
∞∑
k =0
Λt,t+k
[
Pm,t(i)Ym,t+k(i)−Wm,t+kNm,t+k(i)
− γm,t
2
(
Pm,t(i)
Pm,t−1(i)
− 1
)2
Pm,tYm,t − Pm,tφm1
Ym,ss
2
(
Ym,t(i)− Yh,ss
Ym,ss
)2
− Pm,tφm2
Ym,ss
2
(
Ym,t(i)− Yh,t−1(i)
Ym,ss
)2 ]
(1.47)
We can therefore rewrite the Lagrangian for the problem (also in
this case we drop the m to simplify notation):
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L = Λt
[
Pt(i)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)(−εm)
Yt −WtNt − γm
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
)2
PtYt
−MCNt
((
Pt(i)
Pt
)(−εm)
Yt − AtNt
)
− Ptφh1
Yss
2
((
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εm Yt
Yss
− 1
)2
− Ptφh2
Yss
2
((
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εm Yt
Yss
−
(
Pt−1(i)
Pt−1
)−εm Yt−1
Yss
)2]
+ Λt+1
[
Pt+1(i)
(
Pt+1(i)
Pt+1
)(−εm)
Yt+1
−Wt+1Nt+1 − γm
2
(
Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
− 1
)2
Pt+1Yt+1
−MCNt+1
(Pt+1(i)
Pt+1
)(−εm)
Yt+1 − At+1Nt+1

− Pt+1φh1
Yss
2
((
Pt+1(i)
Pt+1
)−εm Yt+1
Yss
− 1
)2
− Pt+1φh2
Yss
2
((
Pt+1(i)
Pt+1
)−εm Yt+1
Yss
−
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εm Yt
Yss
)2]
(1.48)
the first order condition with respect to Pt(i) reads as follows:
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∂L
∂Pt
= (1− εm)Λt
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)(−εm)
Yt − Λtγm Pt
Pt−1(i)
Yt
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
)
+ ΛtMC
N
t εm
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)(−εm−1) Yt
Pt
+ Λtεmφ
h
1Yt
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)(−εm−1)((Pt(i)
Pt
)−εm Yt
Yss
− 1
)
+ Λtεmφ
h
2Yt
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)(−εm−1)((Pt(i)
Pt
)−εm Yt
Yss
−
(
Pt−1(i)
Pt−1
)−εm Yt−1
Yss
)
+ Λt+1γmYt+1
(
1
Pt(i)
)2
Pt+1Pt+1(i)
(
Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
− 1
)
− Λt+1εmφh2Yt
Pt+1
Pt
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)(−εm−1)((Pt+1(i)
Pt+1
)−εm Yt+1
Yss
−
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εm Yt
Yss
)
= 0
(1.49)
Now, divide everything by Λt and by Yt and consider a symmetric
equilibrium in which Pt(i) = Pt:
(1− εm) + εmmcreal = γmpit(pit − 1)− Λt+1
Λt
γm
Yt+1
Yt
(pit+1)
2(pit+1 − 1)
− εmφh1
(
Yt
Yss
− 1
)
− εmφh2
(
Yt
Yss
− Yt−1
Yss
)
+
Λt+1
Λt
εmφ
h
2pit+1
(
Yt+1
Yss
− Yt
Yss
)
(1.50)
This equation reads as the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve mod-
ified to include adjusting cost in housing construction. Indeed, if
φh1 = φ
h
2 = 0, equation (1.50) boils down to equation (1.44).
1.6 The Labor Market
The labor market is modelled in a way similar to Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) since we consider a union operating for each household group
and for each sector.17 However, we assume that unions face quadratic
17While wages can differ across sectors, the probability to readjust the wage is
the same across household’s groups.
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costs à la Rotemberg of adjusting the real wage instead of being sub-
ject to a Calvo scheme:
(1.51)ACw,t =
γw
2
(
Wt
Wt−1
− 1
)2
wt
Households offer homogeneous labor services to unions that dif-
ferentiate labor and set their wages as a mark-up over their marginal
rate of substitution. Labor services are then reassembled by labor
packers that offer labor to goods producers. Solving the unions prob-
lem we have six conditions, two for each households’group. As an
example we report the conditions for savers.
w˜c,t
w˜c,t−1
γ˜w,c
(
w˜c,t
w˜c,t−1
− 1
)
= γw,c
γ λ˜t+1
λ˜t
w˜c,t+1
w˜c,t
w˜c,t+1
w˜c,t
(
w˜c,t+1
w˜c,t
− 1
)
+ (1− εwc) N˜c,t + N˜c,t εwc
w˜c,t
v˜ N˜ η˜c,t
λ˜t
(1.52)
w˜h,t
w˜h,t−1
γ˜w,c
(
w˜h,t
w˜h,t−1
− 1
)
= γw,c
γ λ˜t+1
λ˜t
w˜h,t+1
w˜h,t
w˜h,t+1
w˜h,t
(
w˜h,t+1
w˜h,t
− 1
)
+ (1− εwd) N˜h,t + N˜h,t εwd
w˜h,t
v˜ N˜ η˜h,t
λ˜t
(1.53)
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1.7 Financial Intermediaries
The banking sector is modelled along the lines of GNSS. Banks are di-
vided into two distinct branches: a wholesale and a retail one. Those
two units perform different tasks and this modelling strategy is cho-
sen in order to introduce rate stickiness in the model. In particular,
while the wholesale branch operates under perfect competition, the
retail branch operates into a monopolistic competitive market, which
allows it to set the loan rate as a markup over the interbank rate. The
bank as a whole is subject to a balance sheet identity. Namely the to-
tal amount of loans that it can finance, Lt = L
s−p
t + L
p
t must be equal
to the sum of deposits Dt and equity NWt. Banks can perfectly dis-
criminate between the types of borrowers, but the realization of the
idiosyncratic shock is private information of each single household.
Given that we do not assume any sort of constraint that would limit
banks to hold sub-prime mortgages in their balance sheet, and that
banks require the same risk free interest rate on both types of loans
rlt, we can consider the aggregate level of loans Lt in banks’ balance
sheet equation:
(1.54)Lt = Dt +NWt
Banks are also indifferent in funding themselves via deposits or
equity. However, the introduction of an exogenous capital-to-assets
ratio (i.e. leverage ratio) pins down their liabilities. The introduction
of a optimal leverage might be seen as a way to model capital re-
quirements imposed to banks by international agreement (e.g. Basel
Accords) and it makes banks’ balance sheet play a role in the trans-
mission of shocks to the economy.
1.7.1 Wholesale branch
The bank’s wholesale branch operates under perfect competition. It
funds households’ loans Lt, collects deposits and pays back a deposit
rate rdt , which, is pinned down by the policy rate rt.18 By means of
deposits and internal capital, which evolves according to:
18The implicit assumption behind rdt = rt is that banks can deposit excess funds
at the Central bank at the policy rate.
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(1.55)NWt = (1− δbanks)NWt−1 + div.banksΠbankst−1
The parameter δbanks measures the depreciation of banks capi-
tal, which comes from the resources needed to manage capital itself,
while div.banks measures the banks dividend policy, where Πbankst−1 are
banks profits at time t−1. We assume that banks are subject to an ex-
ogenous capital-to-asset ratio ϕ̂. When banks deviate from that value
they incur a cost. Therefore, on the one hand, banks would be will-
ing to expand their credit supply because this would increase their
profits, on the other hand, in doing so they would pay a cost, there-
fore in steady state the marginal value of an additional loan must be
equal to the marginal cost of funding it. The cost of deviating from
the leverage ratio for a generic bank j is given by:
(1.56)Dev. cost = −kb
2
(
NWt(j)
Lt(j)
− ϕ̂
)2
NWt(j)
The bank maximizes profits over NWt(j) and Dt(j), taking as
given the wholesale loan rate and the deposit rate, respectively rint.t
and rdt :
(1.57)
max
∞∑
t =0
Λ˜0,t
[
(1 + rint.t )Lt(j)− (1 + rdt )Dt(j)
−NWt(j)− kb
2
(
NWt(j)
Lt(j)
− ϕ̂
)2
NWt(j)
]
subject to (1.54). Assuming symmetry across banks,19 the first
order condition of the problem reads as follows:
(1.58)rint.t = r
d
t − kb
(
NWt
Ltott
− ϕ̂
)(
NWt
Ltott
)2
rearranging equation (1.58), and considering rdt = rt, we can see
that the spread in the wholesale banking sector is a positive function
of the leverage of the banking sector (and consequently, it is nega-
tively correlated with the capital to asset ratio):
19An additional assumption is given by the fact that savers own banks, and
therefore the discount factor in the maximization problem refers to this group of
households.
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(1.59)
spreadbanks = r
int.
t − rt
= −kb
(
NWt
Ltott
− ϕ̂
)(
NWt
Ltott
)2
This equation determines a link between banks balance sheet and
banks margin. In particular, in response to a shock to households,
this modelling strategy allows to generate a feedback loop that goes
from borrowers to banks and back to borrowers, for a change in
banks balance sheet affects the spread and therefore households’ bor-
rowing condition. Banks capital also plays a role in determining
credit conditions, for a reduction in banks profit and net worth is
associated with a reduction in lending.
1.7.2 Retail branch
In order to consider sticky bank rates, we assume that retail banks
operate under a regime of monopolistic competition. This implies
that banks set rates, and do so adding a mark-up over the interbank
rate rint.t . Retail banks receive loans from the wholesale branch, for
which they have to pay the interbank rate, they differentiate them at
no cost and offer them to borrowers at a contractual rate that allows
them to earn the risk free loan rate rlt. In carrying on their activity,
they pay quadratic costs if they want to change rates, this implies
inertia in the movements of rlt in response to a shock. Given that
in our model we consider one period mortgages, the introduction of
sticky bank rates might be seen as a way to overcome this initial as-
sumption since it entails some degree of persistence in the mortgage
contract rates. In particular, the final mortgage rate rkt , can be seen
as the combination of two elements. On the one hand there is a risky
component, that is group specific and that reacts immediately to a
shock, on the other hand the rate is given by a component that is de-
termined in the banking sector and reacts only sluggishly to changes
in the economic activity. As it will be clear in the following section,
this entails some important consequences in terms of contagion ef-
fects.
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In order to introduce monopolistic competition in the retail bank-
ing sector we need a further assumption. Namely, the loans bought
by borrowers are a composite CES basket of differentiated products
offered by banks, and the elasticity of substitution, εb,t20 among loan
types governs the degree of banks’ market power. Articulating the
problem in this way allows us to consider a demand for loans which
is given by:
(1.60)Lht (j) =
(
rlt(j)
rlt
)−εbt
LIt
where LIt represents the aggregate demand for loans and Lht (j)
the demand of a single household for loans at bank j. Retail banks
maximize profits subject to (1.60) by choosing the optimal rate rlt(j):
max
∞∑
t =0
Λ˜0,t
[
rlt(j)Lt(j)− rintt Lt(j)−
kh
2
(
rlt(j)
rlt−1(j)
− 1
)2
rlt(j)Lt(j)
]
(1.61)
First order condition of the problem yields the following equa-
tion:
(1.62)
1− εb,t + εb,t (r
int.
t )
rlt
− kh
(
rlt
rlt−1
− 1
)
+
(
rlt+1
rlt
−1
) (
rlt
rlt−1
−1
)
γ λ˜t+1
λ˜t
kkh
(
rlt+1
rlt
−1
)
Lt+1
Lt
= 0
which, assuming no costs in changing the loan rate, namely kh =
0, implies that the loan rate is a mark-up over the interbank rate:
(1.63)rlt =
εb,t
εb,t − 1r
int.
t
Finally, we can write down the overall profits in the banking sec-
tor, which for bank j, can be written as:
(1.64)
Πbanks = rltLt − rdtDt −
kb
2
(
NWt(j)
Lt(j)
− ϕ̂
)2
NWt(j)
− kh
2
(
rlt(j)
rlt−1(j)
− 1
)2
rlt(j)Lt(j)
20Notice the t subscript, which implies that we allow for the possibility of shocks
to banks mark-up.
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1.8 Equilibrium Conditions
Total nominal output in the economy is given by the sum of output
in the non-durable and in the housing sector:
(1.65)YtPc,t = Yc,tPc,t + Yh,tPh,t
We define real output as follows:
(1.66)Yt = Yc,t + ph,tYh,t
where the real housing price is defined as ph,t =
Ph,t
Pc,t
.
Notice that, as common in the literature with durable goods, in
our IRFs we consider total output at constant relative prices. Namely
we keep ph,t fixed at its steady state level p¯h,t. The market clearing
condition in the non-durable sector requires total output in c to be
equal to aggregate demand:
(1.67)Yc,t = (1− ξ)C˜t + ξ(1− ϑ)Cs−pt + ξϑCpt
In the housing sector, total output is equal to the total amount of
investment carried out by each households’ group:
(1.68)
Yh,t = (1− ξ)[H˜t − (1− δ)H˜t−1]
+ ξ(1 + ϑ)[Hs−pt − (1− µGt(ω¯s−pt )Hs−pt−1 )(1− δ)]
+ ξ(ϑ)[Hpt − (1− µGt(ω¯pt )Hpt−1)(1− δ)]
Notice, the equilibrium condition for housing investment is gross
of monitoring costs.
With respect to the labor market the equilibrium condition re-
quires the following equations for savers, sub-primers and primers
to be satisfied with equality:
(1.69)
∫ 1
0
= N˜m,t(ι)dι
= (1− ξ)N˜m,t
(1.70)
∫ 1
0
= N s−pm,t (ι)dι
= ξ(1− ϑ)N s−pm,t
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(1.71)
∫ 1
0
= Npm,t(ι)dι
= ξϑNpm,t
Finally, the equilibrium condition in the credit market requires
total loans to be equal to deposits plus aggregate banks’ net worth:
(1.72)ξ(1− ϑ)Ls−pt + ξϑLpt = (1− ξ)D˜t +NWt
1.9 Monetary Policy
We consider a Central Bank seeking to control inflation and output
through a Taylor Rule operating via changes in the nominal interest
rate:
(1.73)
1 + rft
1 + r¯f
= [piφpiC,t]
1−φr
[
1 + rft−1
1 + r¯f
]φr [(
Yt
Yt−1
)φy]1−φr
AM,t
where r¯f is the steady state risk free nominal interest rate, φr is
the coefficient associated to the lagged interest rate, φpi the coefficient
associated to the inflation target and φy the coefficient that measures
the response to changes in the output gap. Finally AM,t is a shock to
the monetary policy, which evolves according to:
(1.74)lnAM,t = ρM lnAM,t−1 + εM,t
where εM,t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and standard
deviation equal to σM .
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1.10 Calibration
Our calibration is based on the U.S. economy, for the focus of our pa-
per is the financial crisis that originated in the U.S. mortgage market.
We calibrate the share of constrained borrowers to 36% following a
well established literature on the U.S. economy. For the share of sub-
primers we refer to the report on the financial crisis issued by the The
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011). According to the report
the share of sub-prime mortgages originated in the U.S. over the total
amount of mortgages fluctuated considerably in recent years. While
it has been around 9% from 1996 to 2003 in 2004 it spiked to 20.9%
and it remained close to this figure in the following two years before
getting back to 9.2% in 2007. Given this figures we decide to cali-
brate the share of sub-primers to a value (10%) close to the pre-crisis
level. Note that this entails the overall share of sub-primers being
equal to only 3.6% of total households. In order to take into account
the change in this share and the implied consequences of a higher
number of sub-prime borrowers, we consider different values in our
simulations.
To calibrate the deep parameters of the model we follow FL and we
refer to a largely consolidate literature on the topic. For the part re-
lated to financial intermediaries we mainly follow GNSS. The param-
eter α that measures the weight of housing in the utility function has
been chosen as in FL in order to get a share of housing over total
GDP of 8% in steady state. This measure reflects the combined share
of residential and non residential fixed investment in structures in
the U.S. economy for the period 2000-200721.
In order to get a yearly risk free rate of 4% we set the discount rate of
savers to 0.99. We calibrate the discount factor of borrowers, the stan-
dard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock, the monitoring costs and
the stigma component to obtain in steady state the rate of default
for primers and sub-primers recorded in the National Delinquency
Survey. Namely, our target is the default rate in the first trimester of
2006, when, on the verge of the crisis the default for primers equalled
0.77% and that of for sub-primers 6.2%. The resulting loan to value
21As noted by FL, this share has been historically lower on average, being equal
to 5% over the period 1960-2009.
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ratio is equal to 63.5% for sub-primers, which is a result not far to the
average loan to value ratio of 75.7% registered in the U.S between
1973 and 2008 as noted by FL.22 The LTV ratio for primers in our
calibration is 55%, a result that we consider sensible, given that the
calibrated rate of default is considerably lower than the average rate
of default in the mortgage sector.23 We assign a value of 0.12 to the
monitoring costs incurred by banks when they want to assess the
outcome of a defaulting investor, while we assign a value of 0.2 to the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock. Both values are in line
with the calibration used by FL and BGG. Notice that we assume the
same standard deviation for both borrower types. This stresses that
our distinction of sub-primers does not rest on any parameter differ-
ent from the stigma component. The spread between the thirty year
conventional mortgage rate and the interest rate on the U.S. Treasury
thirty-year bond has been on average 150 basis point. While FL cali-
brate this spread to only 50 basis point in our calibration the spread
is equal to 115bp for primers and 215bp for sub-primers. This spread
is the combination of two distinct features in our model. First, banks
set the risk free loan rate rlt as a mark up over the interbank rate,
which is ultimately pinned down by the policy rate. Assuming an
elasticity of substitution of 5, the mark-up is equal to 20%, imply-
ing a 100bp spread between the two rates.24 Second, the presence of
the agency problem between borrowers and banks, accounts for the
spread between the risk free loan rate and the contractual rate, which
is equal to 4.1% for primers and 6.2% for sub-primers.
For the short and long run elasticities in the adjustment costs of hous-
ing investment we follow the calibration presented in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2010). By assigning a value of 1 to χ – the parameter measur-
ing the elasticity of substitution between housing and consumption
in the consumption bundle – the function becomes a Cobb-Douglas.
The value of the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply η is 1
22Notice that in calibrating the parameters related to primers and sub-primer
we must make a choice between targeting the LTV ratios and the default rates.
We could have increased the LTV ratio for sub-primers by playing around with
the above mentioned structural parameters. However, we preferred to limit the
differences between the two classes of borrowes to a minimum.
23Around 2% in 2006.
24This value is also in line with Gertler and Karadi (2011)
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and the weight of labor in the utility function is households specific
and calibrated such that each individual agent chooses to work 1/3
of her available time in steady state, while the parameter that mea-
sures habits in consumption is equal to 0.6. The elasticity parameters
in both sectors and in the wage Phillips curve are chosen in order to
have a mark-up of 15%. We calibrate γc and γw,m in order to render
the same situation that under Calvo pricing mechanism makes firm
and unions adjusting respectively their prices and wages on average
once every four quarters. House prices are instead left perfectly flex-
ible as in most of the literature on housing, therefore we set γh = 0.25
In order to pin down the level of banks net worth in steady state,
we need to assume a depreciation rate in banks’ capital equal to 0.01,
while the dividend policy of the banks is exogenously fixed to 0.67.
The parameters measuring the adjustment costs in the banking sec-
tor are instead based on GNSS’s findings, while in our baseline cal-
ibration the capital-to-asset ratio is equal to 0.1, implying a banking
leverage of 10. Finally, the parameters in the monetary policy rule
are based on the estimated results in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
25Under our modellization of the labor market the presence of different discount
factors for borrowers and savers implies slightly different values for the parame-
ters related to the cost of adjusting wages.
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TABLE 1.1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Name Value Description
η 1 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
βs 0.99 Discount factor of Savers
δd 0.01 Rate of depreciation of housing
βb 0.96 Discount factor of Borrowers
εc 7.5 Elasticity of substitution for C goods
εd 7.5 Elasticity of substitution for D goods
εwc 7.5 Elasticity of substitution labor in C
εwd 7.5 Elasticity of substitution labor in D
φpi 1.44 Taylor rule sensitivity to inflation
φy 0,52 Taylor rule sensitivity to output
φR 0.59 Taylor rule smoothing
ρe 0.0 Autoregressive parameter shock TR
ξ 0.36 Share of constrained agents
ϑ 0.1 Share of sub-primers
ϕD1 0.33 Adjustment costs. housing (SR)
ϕD1 0.66 Adjustment costs. housing (LR)
bh 0.6 Habits in consumption paramter
µ 0.12 Monitoring costs
σp 0.2 Standard deviation id. shock primers
σp 0.2 Standard deviation id. shock sub-primers
ρs 0.9 Autocorrelation idios. shock
εb 5 Elasticity banks loans
ϕ̂ 0.1 Optimal capital asset ratio
δbanks 0.01 Depreciation banks capital
div.banks 0.67 Banks’ div. policy
kb 10.63 Adjusting cost param. banks
kh 13.58 Adjusting cost param. hous. loan dem
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1.11 Experiments
In this section we analyze the dynamics of the model after having lin-
earized it around the steady state. We focus on two different shocks:
a shock to the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock that hits
sub-primers’ housing investment and a monetary policy shock. We
present the impulse response functions of each shock and we also
show the difference entailed by considering the benchmark model,
characterized by a non-trivial financial sector, and a model which
has no frictions in the circulation of funds from lenders to borrowers.
We characterize this second model by switching the costs related to
changes in the interbank and in the loan rate to zero, kb and kh re-
spectively. The dynamics of the model are influenced by financial
frictions, which are given by endogenous variations in the balance
sheet of both constrained agents and banks. As a consequence, the
results of our baseline model are given by the interaction and coexis-
tence of different channels. One the one hand, we have the frictions
that characterize the borrowers’ side, on the other hand those related
to the banking sector. Borrowers face collateral constraints and run
up nominal debt, which, as explained by Iacoviello (2005), is a com-
mon characteristic of mortgage contracts in all advanced economies.
As a result, changes in the asset values, i.e. house prices, and in the
inflation rate – Fisher effect – have a direct impact on households’
borrowing conditions. Binding collateral constraints are instead af-
fected by changes in the real interest rate. Indeed, an increase in the
cost of the mortgage impairs borrowers’ ability to get loans and to-
gether with nominal debt contributes to a magnification of shocks.
Banking sectors’ balance sheet are instead important for they influ-
ence directly credit conditions and therefore affect the shadow value
of borrowing. The presence of banks is also indirectly connected to
credit conditions, for their presence alters the dynamics of the model
and therefore has repercussions on households through the other
channels mentioned. The idiosyncratic risk in housing investment
allows us to single out a peculiar source of shock, which – to our
knowledge – has never been analyzed in the presence of a non-trivial
banking sector. Furthermore, modelling sub-primers adds an addi-
tional degree of heterogeneity to the model which allows to study
46 Chapter 1. Sub-prime Mortgages and Banking in a DSGE Model
the effects of a change in the share of borrowers over the total of con-
strained agents, the pass-through of the shock to the other house-
holds’ groups and the distributional consequences of monetary pol-
icy.
1.11.1 A Shock to the Standard Deviation of Sub-primers’
Idiosyncratic Shock
The first shock we consider is an increase in the standard deviation
of the idiosyncratic shock on sub-primers’ housing investment. The
shock evolves according to the following process:
(1.75)ln
σωsp,t
σ¯ωsp
= ρσωsp ln
σωsp,t−1
σ¯ωsp
+ εσωsp ,t
where σ¯ωsp is the steady state value of the standard deviation and
ρσωsp is the serial correlation coefficient. εσωsp ,t is an i.i.d. shock with
a standard deviation equal to σσωsp and a mean of zero. A mean pre-
serving increase in the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock
brings about an increase in the rate of default for any given thresh-
old level ω¯. This result is a direct consequence of the properties of
the log-normal distribution, in fact an increase in the standard de-
viation thickens the tails of the distribution meaning that – for the
same ω¯ – more households end-up in the left tail of the distribution
and therefore the rate of default increases. Figure 1.7 shows two log-
normal distributions characterized by the same mean and a different
standard deviations as an illustrative example.
An increase in sub-primers’ rate of default goes hand in hand
with an increase in monitoring costs that coupled with the ensu-
ing rise in risk entails a spike in the contractual rate of mortgages
paid by sub-primers. We calibrate the shock in order to get on im-
pact an increase of sub-primers’ default rate equal to 16.42%, which
corresponds to the percentage of seriously delinquent loans in the
first quarter of 2008, when the financial crisis started. The impulse
response functions are plotted in figure 1.8. As financing loans be-
comes more expensive and the risk of default increases, sub-primers
loan to value declines, implying lower housing and non-durable con-
sumption for the group. This mechanism is exacerbated by a feed-
back loop that works through declining house prices, that further
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FIGURE 1.7: The log normal distribution for two different values of the stan-
dard deviation.
reduce the loan to value ratio and are especially important in reduc-
ing sub-primers’ consumption of housing. The initial shock, despite
confined to a very small fraction of the model’s population – i.e. only
3.6% of all households are sub-primers –, brings about a reduction
in total output of about 0.2%, which is driven by a contraction in
both sectors. The magnitude of the recession is affected by the con-
tagion effect that transmits via the banking sector and via the real
economy from sub-primers to primers and also partly affects savers.
As macroeconomic conditions deteriorate so do banks profits and
banks’ net worth. Banks have to pay a cost whenever they deviate
from the optimal capital to asset (i.e. leverage) ratio. An increase
in the banks leverage ratio reduces banks margins, which eventually
affect the loan rate, for loan rates are set as a mark-up over the inter-
bank rate. Loans reduction, combined with declining house prices,
reduces primers consumption of durable and housing. The decrease
in house prices is responsible for the increase in the risk premium
and in the default rate of primers. Notice, however that the risk
premium spread between the two groups, measured by rk,s−pt − rk,pt
increases, which means that sub-primers’ external finance premium
increases relatively more.
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FIGURE 1.8: A shock to the standard deviation of sub-primers idiosyncratic shock. All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady
state. Loan rates, rate of defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in levels.
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The risk free loan rate only responds sluggishly to changing eco-
nomic conditions, reflecting on the one hand monopolistic power in
the banking sector, while on the other hand it can be thought as a
proxy of mortgage contracts with a duration that is longer than one
period. More precisely, we can think of the mortgage contract as
composed by a component that adjusts quickly to increasing risk in
the households’ willingness to repay their debts and by a part that
adjusts only sluggishly.
As figure 1.9 shows, the transmission of the shock from sub-primers
to primers depends on the degree of flexibility of the risk free rate on
mortgages. When rlt is stickier, and therefore it declines less in re-
sponse to a change in banks’capitalization, the original shock trans-
mits more powerfully on primers, entailing a lower reduction of loans
and of consumption of both durable and non-durable goods. The
stickiness of the loan rate partly sheds banks from the shock, indeed
their net worth is less affected by the shock. While this has posi-
tive effects on the economy, the overall dynamics are dominated by
the effect on prices. We can therefore consider the degree of rates
stickiness as a measure of the role played by banks’ balance sheets in
acting as a cushion to the shock. The lower the stickiness, the more
the banks absorb the shock and the less it transmits to primers.
Due to the stickiness introduced in the labor market, real wages
decline in both sectors for all households categories. However, their
labor response is at odds 1.10. Indeed, while sub-primers increase
their labor efforts, primers and savers increase leisure. The income
effect stemming from a reduction in the real wages, combined with
a relative increase of non-durable prices implies a reduction of con-
sumption for savers, while they increase their purchase of durable
goods, for they find more convenient to buy durables given lower
house prices.
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FIGURE 1.9: A shock to the standard deviation of sub-primers’ idiosyncratic
shock. All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady state.
Loan rates, rate of defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in
levels.
FIGURE 1.10: A shock to the standard deviation of sub-primers’ idiosyncratic
shock. All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady state.
Loan rates, rate of defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in
levels.
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The exercise carried out so far does not contemplate the possibil-
ity of an increase in the share of sub-primers on the total share of
constrained agents. However, a salient fact of the build-up of the
financial crisis has been the steep increase in that share. Indeed, in
2006 at the verge of the financial crisis, the sub-prime share of the en-
tire mortgage market rose to 23.5%. Our modelling strategy allows
us to quantify the effect of an increase in the share of sub-primers. In
figure 1.11, we simulate the same shock as above, but allowing for
different shares of sub-primers, namely 0%, 5%, 10% –our baseline
value– and 23.5%. We see that the effects of the shock becomes quite
significant as we increase the share of sub-primers to the pre-crisis
levels. Output contracts by about 0.4% within four quarters, while
the decline in housing is much larger and close to 1%. This is due to
the stronger and more persistent decrease in house prices.
FIGURE 1.11: A shock to the standard deviation of sub-primers’ idiosyncratic
shock. All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady state.
Loan rates, rate of defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in
levels.
Also, the contagion effects from sub-primers to the other house-
holds’ groups in the model gets magnified by the increasing size of
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high leveraged borrowers. Figure 1.12, shows that the amplification
of the shock starts in the banking sector, with a reduction of banks
net worth and continues through the same channels analyzed above,
implying an increase in the rate of default of primers and a decrease
in the consumption of both durables and non-durables for this group
of borrowers. Savers consumption also declines more, while the sub-
stitution effects from non-durable to durable goods gets magnified.
FIGURE 1.12: A shock to the standard deviation of sub-primers’ idiosyncratic
shock. All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady state.
Loan rates, rate of defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in
levels.
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1.11.2 Monetary policy shock
In this section, we analyze the impulse response functions of the
model to a 25 basis point increase in the policy rate. The literature
on models featuring non-durable goods highlights the difficulties
of theoretical models in matching the empirical evidence, notably
with respect to the co-movement between consumption and residen-
tial investment. As documented in in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010),
New-Keynesian models featuring nominal wage rigidities, habit in
consumption and adjusting cost in housing investment deliver theo-
retical impulse responses that are consistent with the VAR evidence.
Our model features all those ingredients and as figure A.3 shows it
renders well all the qualitative effect of a monetary policy tightening
on the economy.
The increase in the nominal interest rate is contractionary, and, in
particular, the response of the model confirms the empirical evidence
on monetary policy with housing, which highlights not only the co-
movement of output in the durable and non-durable sector but also
that housing contracts more than consumption.
The main finding, is in line with what already highlighted by
GNSS, namely that the presence of sticky bank rates attenuates the
impact of a monetary policy shock. Indeed, the overall contraction is
quite small if compared to the empirical evidence of a monetary pol-
icy shock in the U.S.. This highlights the absence in this model of a
risk channel related to the financial sector, which could actually mag-
nify the effects of a monetary policy shock. An interesting result that
can be analyzed given our modelling strategy is the re-distributional
consequence of monetary policy. Indeed, the transmission of mone-
tary policy in our model is somewhat different from a standard New-
Keynesian model. The reason is due to the contemporary presence
of financial frictions in the form of an endogenous loan to value ratio
and in the form of frictions tied to the banking sector’s balance sheet.
Differently from previous models that studied the response of the
economy to a monetary policy shock, our model includes two differ-
ent classes of borrowers and is therefore interesting to see the con-
comitant response of primers and sub-primers to the shock. Calza,
Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) showed that economies characterized
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FIGURE 1.13: 25 basis point increase in the policy rate. All variable are ex-
pressed as a percentage deviation from steady state. Loan rates, rate of defaults,
loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in levels.
by higher loan to value ratios are less resilient to a monetary pol-
icy shock. Our results confirm and strengthen that finding for the
response of sub-primers to the monetary tightening is stronger than
that of primers. Both the default rate and contractual rates increase,
bringing about an increase in the loan to value ratio of both classes
of borrowers. However the increase is stronger for sub-primers and
as a result the sub-primers/primers spread increases. This latter fac-
tor explains why the reduction in the amount of loans is higher for
sub-primers. The reasons behind those results are manifold. First of
all, the increase in the nominal interest rate – which in turns pushes
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up the return that banks ask on the loans granted to borrowers – in-
creases the shadow value of borrowing, for it is now more expensive
for borrowers to tilt preferences towards current consumption. Sec-
ondly, borrowers’ equity declines,26 and given that sub-primers have
a higher loan to value ratio they are more sensitive to the decrease
in the present value of equity. Furthermore, following a monetary
shock, relative house prices decline, in line with the assumption that
house prices are more flexible than non-durable prices. Therefore,
the Fisher effect kicks in and it further reduces household’s equity
through an increase of real debt.
Finally, it is interesting to notice that the shock has a negative ef-
fect also on banks net worth. This effect is given by two different
factors. First, a reduction in the intermediation of banks entails a
reduction in the net worth, as well as the decline in house prices re-
duces its value. Second, the increase in the banking rate is lower than
the monetary policy increase. This further compresses banks spread
and reduces their net worth. The response of savers – who are con-
sumption smoother – is standard. The Euler equation suggests that
savers respond to an increase in the risk free interest rate by substi-
tuting current with future consumption. At the same time the de-
cline in house prices implies a substitution effect from consumption
to housing. Finally, notice that in response to the shock, savers in-
crease leisure much more than the other households groups.
1.11.3 Frictionless vs friction economy
What are the responses of the benchmark model when compared to
a model that does not consider frictions in the banking sector? This
is question is important, for one innovation of our paper to the lit-
erature that analyses endogenous LTV ratios for households is the
introduction of a non-trivial banking sector. Figure 1.14, shows the
impulse responses for the shocks analyzed in the previous sections.
We disentangle the effect of sticky rates and of banks’ balance sheet.
The first row compares the results in the case of a shock in the stan-
dard deviation of sub-primers idiosyncratic shock for the benchmark
26This can be seen from the budget constraint
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model (in blue) and a model where we switch off both costs con-
sidered in the banking sector (in red) and therefore representing an
economy where funds flow freely from banks to borrowers. In the
latter case, banks’ balance sheet has no effect overall on the circu-
lation of credit, while loan rates are flexible. The presence of both
FIGURE 1.14: All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady
state. First row represents an economy where both adjustment costs in the
bank sector are switched off. Second row, instead, only costs of adjusting the
loan rate are off.
frictions in the banking sector magnifies the response of total output,
consumption and housing investment in response to an increase in
the standard deviation of sub-primer’s shock. When we allow rates
to move freely, but we still keep positive the elasticity of the banking
spread to changes in the leverage, the outcome is still contractionary
if compared to the flexible economy case. This underlines the role
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played by banks balance sheet in the circulation of credit. By disen-
tangling the two sources of frictions we note that sticky rates have
a quantitatively more important role in determining the magnitude
of the contraction. Indeed, when loan rates are flexible the shock is
partly absorbed by banks, which shed borrowers and limit the con-
tagion to primers. In the case of a monetary policy shock, the trans-
mission of the shock is magnified in the absence of frictions in the
banking sector. This result is driven by the fact that the loan rate can
increase freely, therefore implying a stronger effect on constrained
agents.
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1.12 Conclusion
The recent crisis that originated in the U.S. residential market under-
scored the importance of frictions in the circulation of credit. The
depth of the recession, and the inability of a large part of the eco-
nomic profession to foresee the crisis are at the basis of the revision of
the research agenda related to the development of quantitative eco-
nomic models. In particular, DSGE models, which are the workhorse
models in the analysis of the business cycle, have been since then
amended in order to take into account relevant frictions.
In this paper we tried to contribute to the growing literature on fi-
nancial frictions by introducing frictions on both sides of the credit
relationship and by studying a shock to a riskier class of borrowers.
On the one hand, borrowers are constrained by the value of their col-
lateral in the amount of debt that they can run up. On the other hand,
loan rates are sticky, while changes in banks’ balance sheet affect the
margin that banks get on loans. In the model, we add a further de-
gree of heterogeneity with respect to the canonical model that takes
into account constrained households. We do this by modelling sub-
prime borrowers, which differ from primers for their higher rate of
default, loan to value ratio and for the rate they have to pay on their
mortgages. Given that housing investment is risky, we can study
the effect of a shock that affects only this riskier class of borrowers.
The propagation of the shock to the real economy are influenced by
the frictions introduced in the model. In particular, when banks de-
viate from the optimal capital-to-asset ratio, they see their margins
decline, this has an effect on the economy which depends on the de-
gree of price stickiness. Stickier bank rates exacerbate the contagion
effect that goes from sub-primers to primers. We also study how a
monetary policy shock transmits to the economy in the presence of
this further degree of heterogeneity on the borrowers side. We find
that sub-primers – who are more leveraged – are more sensitive to
movements in the policy rate and that the presence of frictions in the
banking sector attenuates the magnitude of the shock.
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Abstract
This work studies the effect of financial frictions on fiscal policy.
More precisely, it focuses on the introduction of a collateral con-
straint tied to the expected value of the housing stock for a group
of households. The presence of this kind of financial friction has im-
portant consequences for the transmission of fiscal policy, given that
constrained and unconstrained households reaction to the shock is at
odds. The model designed in this work also allows to compare the ef-
fect of a relatively large menu of taxes on the main macro-aggregates
and to study changes in one of the institutional characteristic of the
credit market, namely the loan-to-value ratio. Financial frictions af-
fect the transmission of fiscal policy through compositional effects,
and public expenditure seems to be the most effective fiscal shock to
expand output in the short-run.
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2.1 Introduction
The greater consideration conceded by macroeconomists during the
last few decades placed monetary policy in a position of preeminence
with respect to fiscal policy. This is especially true if we consider the
theoretical literature that stretches back to the Real Business Cycle
(RBC) models and that subsequently, by incorporating Keynesian el-
ements, continued with DSGE models1 and resulted eventually in
what has been defined the new-neoclassical synthesis. Recent de-
velopments connected to the financial crisis and the Great Recession
renewed the interest towards the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Cen-
tral banks around the world reacted firmly to declining GDPs by de-
creasing interest rates and often resorted to unconventional mone-
tary policy measures to get over the limitation of zero lower bounds.
However, according to some economists, lagging growth rates and
the spectre of deflation in Europe make an argument for resorting
more on fiscal policy as a tool for business cycle stabilization.
Both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view, the effects of
an increase in government expenditure on output, consumption and
investment are not clear. In particular, while most of the evidence at
our disposal recognizes the expansionary effects of fiscal policy, in
the form of an increase in government expenditure or as tax reduc-
tions, there is not the same sort of agreement on some other impor-
tant issues. Namely, there is still uncertainty surrounding the size
of the fiscal multipliers2 and there is still not wide agreement on the
qualitative response of consumption and investment and some other
main macroeconomic variables. In a recent paper aimed at gauging
the relative contribution of tax cuts and government expenditure on
growth, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) argue that “It is fair to say that
we know relatively little about the effect of fiscal policy on growth
and in particular about the so called fiscal multipliers, namely how
much one dollar of tax cuts or spending increases translates in terms
1As an illustrative example, one might consider that one of the leading graduate
textbooks on DSGE models , Galí (2008), explicitly refers to monetary policy in the
title while does not mention fiscal policy throughout the rest of the book.
2On this topic, an interesting reading is Blanchard and Leigh (2013). The au-
thors find that fiscal multipliers have probably been higher than what assumed by
forecasters during the consolidation episodes triggered by the financial crisis.
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of GDP”. Those considerations suggest that more research is needed
on the topic to clarify the effects of fiscal policy.
In the theoretical literature, as put by Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés
(2007), the part of the academic profession closer to the neoclassi-
cal tenets, underlines the importance of the Ricardian equivalence,
through which households’ consumption decisions suffer from the
expected future increase in taxes resulting from expansionary fiscal
policies. At the opposite side of the spectrum, a strand of economists
closer to the Keynesian tradition, refutes those conclusions and in-
sists on a positive correlation between expansionary fiscal policy and
consumption. When it comes to investment, the debate is even more
blurred and less polarized, for there is not complete agreement on
the crowding effect of government spending.
DSGE models are used by central banks and major institutions
around the world for policy analysis and have been used in the academia
to offer analytical support to a broad range of economic ideas. Those
models have the advantage of being micro-founded, their structural
nature allows an easy identification of shocks and they can be used
as laboratory to analyse the effect of policies, therefore providing fer-
tile ground to test the effectiveness of fiscal policy. However, to do
so it becomes crucial to introduce in those models the right elements.
The financial crisis exposed some limitations of DSGE models, and
paved the way for an increase in the contribution of works on finan-
cial frictions. An interesting way of introducing financial frictions in
DSGE models is strictly connected to the presence of housing. The
introduction of housing in DSGE models stretches back to Barsky,
House, and Kimball (2007) and acquired attention in the literature
by performing the additional role of collateral for constrained agents
with Iacoviello (2005). However, most of the papers that followed
this strand of literature have been interested in assessing the effect
of monetary policy rather than that of fiscal policy, whose effects are
still somewhat unexplored.
Most of the models that discuss the response of a DSGE model to
fiscal policy share some limitations: they either consider only non-
distortionary taxation or focus only on government expenditure, and/or
they rely on a Walrasian labor market. On top of that there are very
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few studies that take the distance from the representative agent prob-
lem which is illustrative of smooth credit markets. The aim of this pa-
per is to fill this gap in the literature by considering financial frictions
in a DSGE model that includes also all the ingredients that the liter-
ature considers fundamental in order to replicate qualitatively and
quantitatively the response to a monetary policy shock. As made
clear by the theoretical research on housing and monetary policy, it
is necessary to add wage stickiness, and adjustment costs of housing
investment, in addition to other more used frictions such as habits in
consumption and price stickiness,3 to render the empirical effects of
a monetary policy shock. Taking this approach allows me to have a
baseline model over which to test the importance of those frictions in
the context of a fiscal expansion. However, some caveats are in order.
The first one is that the presence of several frictions at the same time
makes it difficult to disentangle the role played by each single friction
in delivering the final results. The second one, is that I am aware that
this study cannot be conclusive on the quantitative side, for other
important ingredients might be missing in the model.4 Therefore,
particularly the quantitative suggestions of this work, such as the
size of the multiplier, have to be taken with caution.
An interesting work that tries to tackle the effect of fiscal policy
and financial frictions is the paper by Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
By resorting to the classical financial accelerator model of Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), the author tries to assess which is the
most effective fiscal policy shock in order to boost output in the short
run. In this paper I follow a similar approach, however the differ-
ences with this work are substantial. First of all, I model heterogene-
ity and financial frictions in a different way. Following Iacoviello
(2005), and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), households are divided in
two separate groups, borrowers and savers. Borrowers, although
still intertemporal optimizing agents, are constrained in the amount
that they can borrow to the value of their collateral, which is given
by the expected value of their housing stock. Second, the presence
of housing allows me to study the effect o a larger menu of taxes
3See on this Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006), Sterk (2010) and the third chapter.
4I think, just as an illustrative example, at the presence of rule of thumb con-
sumers.
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and to consider the effect of fiscal policy on residential investment.
Third, I can study what happens to a change in an institutional char-
acteristic of the credit market. Namely, I investigate the response of
the model when there is a change in the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
This experiment replicates what Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013)
have already done with respect to monetary policy, and it is inter-
esting for its effects on the two distinct classes of borrowers. This
exercise is also useful not only because economies are characterized
by heterogeneous LTV ratios, but also to think about macropruden-
tial policies. Whit this paper I try to add on the debate on the effects
of fiscal policy, and I seek to shed some lights on its transmission
to the economy. Indeed, the distinction of households in two sepa-
rate groups has normative implications, for constrained households
response is very distant from that of Ricardian households.
2.2 Literature Review
As already mentioned in the previous section, there are only a few
studies that focus on fiscal policy if compared to the large body of
literature, especially from a theoretical point of view, that focuses on
monetary policy. An important issue, extensively analysed in the-
oretical papers, has been to reconcile empirical and theoretical ev-
idence with respect to the positive correlation between output and
consumption after a shock in government spending – the so called
Government-Spending-Puzzle. The ancestors of New-Keynesian DSGE
models, RBC models, underlined how according to the Ricardian
equivalence an increase in government expenditure is internalized
by agents, therefore entailing a reduction in consumption through
wealth effects which make households to work more and cut con-
sumption. A possible solution to this puzzle has been presented by
Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007). In this paper, the authors use
an idea put forward by Mankiw (2000), that of the presence of rule-
of-thumb (RoT) consumers, so called because they are not intertem-
poral optimizer but they rather spend all their income at any given
period. The presence of this particular category of households curbs
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the negative effect of Ricardian agents, and it allows – for some pa-
rameterizations – to revert the initial conclusions of RBC models5.
Bilbiie and Straub (2004) build on Gali and analyse a richer frame-
work characterized by distortionary taxation and a Walrasian labor
market. They conclude that it is more complicated to reproduce the
effect seen in data with respect to consumption in this larger set-up.
In particular, what helps to render empirical consistent results is a
low degree of persistence in the fiscal shocks, a weak response of
monetary policy to inflation and a high degree of price stickiness.
They also underscore the important role played in the model by the
real wage, that needs to fluctuate considerably for consumption to
increase after an increase in government expenditure. The procycli-
cality of the real wage is however a feature that is not confirmed in
the data. Colciago (2011) adds on the literature by introducing wage
stickiness in a model that considers RoT consumers. He finds that in
this context the real wage does not move as much as without wage
rigidities and therefore the effect of fiscal policy is attenuated. Al-
panda and Zubairy (2013) investigate in a model with constrained
households what are the effects of tax policies related to housing on
macro variables. The paper is interesting for it singles out the effect
of a large menu of house related taxes6 and concludes that in order
to reduce household debt and raise more revenues from taxation the
most effective instrument is to eliminate the mortgage interest de-
duction. Albonico, Paccagnini, and Tirelli (2016) design and estimate
a DSGE model to study the fiscal stance of the Euro Area. Their es-
timated share of non-ricardian agents (53%) is somewhat larger than
what has been estimated in previous research, therefore implying
larger fiscal multipliers. One of the few papers that deals with the
introduction of financial frictions on the households side is Roeger
and Veld (2009). In the paper the authors use a version of the Euro-
pean Commission model, the Quest III, to investigate the effect of the
5The mechanism works through the following lines: RoT agents are not influ-
enced by the wealth effect that stems from fiscal policy, but they are strongly af-
fected by labor income. Therefore, the presence of nominal price rigidities allows
real wages to rise, allowing them to increase current consumption.
6They consider the following taxes: increasing property tax rates, eliminating
the mortgage interest deduction, eliminating the depreciation allowance for rental
income, instituting taxation of imputed rental income from owner-occupied hous-
ing and eliminating the property tax deduction.
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presence of constrained borrowers on fiscal policy, which is assumed
to be passive. In this paper, the government is not explicitly mod-
elled and fiscal shocks are assumed to follow simple autoregressive
processes that do not pose any strain on government budgets, being
the latter excluded by the analysis. The authors find that adding con-
strained households in this medium-scale DSGE model makes fiscal
policy more effective, especially when monetary policy is accomoda-
tive. My work shares some methodological aspects with it, namely
the way borrowers are modelled, but differs from that analysis in
many directions. First, in this work I study a larger menu of taxes,
and focus on their effect at impact on the economy, with the idea of
identifying the best policy option to revive output in the short run.
In order to do so, following Fernández-Villaverde (2010), I calibrate
the shocks in a way that makes them comparable. More precisely, the
magnitude of the shocks is such that it generates the same drag on
governments’ budget. To carry out this task, it becomes then crucial
to model the fiscal authorities in details. Second, I analyse the result
of varying institutional characteristics of the credit market, which
are identified in changes in the loan-to-value ratio. Finally, following
most of the literature that analyses fiscal policy, I introduce and pro-
vide results for two different specifications of fiscal rules, and model
the government sector explicitly. Considering a fiscal rule is impor-
tant, for a large majority of advanced countries, but also some devel-
oping ones, follow one or more national or supernational rules.7
From an empirical point of view, several studies agree on the fact that
an increase in government expenditure has a positive effect on out-
put, consumption and hours worked. Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
use vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis and find evidence of the
positive effect of government spending on output, while investment
is crowded out and the multiplier is relatively small (close to one).
Fatás and Mihov (2001) find that the fiscal multiplier is larger than
one and that the increase in output after an expansionary fiscal shock
is mainly driven by the response of consumption, while the response
of investment is mute. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) using VAR with
7See the following link for a detailed overview of fiscal rules used around the
world: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/FiscalRules/map/map.htm
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sign restriction find that deficit-financed tax cuts are the best instru-
ment to boost output. In particular, they find that for the government
spending scenario the multiplier is smaller than the one estimated
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They find that consumption is posi-
tive only on impact and investment is crowded out by the increase in
government expenditure. Interestingly enough, real wages do not in-
crease in response to the shock.8 Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007)
also provide an empirical analysis based on VAR and find that a pos-
itive shock in government expenditure is associated with a persistent
rise in consumption, income, real wages and output. The response
of investment is slightly negative but not significant.
2.3 The Model
The model draws partly from Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and partly
from Fernández-Villaverde (2010). More precisely, I model hetero-
geneity on the households side and therefore financial frictions as in
the former paper, while I follow the latter for the characterization of
the government sector, the monetary policy rule and the design of
shocks. Furthermore, beside the fiscal rule in Fernández-Villaverde
(2010), for some scenarios I consider that in Gali, López-Salido, and
Vallés (2007). Models with housing and financial frictions have been
subject to a large scrutiny by the literature with respect to a monetary
policy shock. This allows me to confidently introduce adjustment
costs in capital accumulation, wage rigidities and habit in consump-
tion, for they are key in replicating some empirical facts.9 The model
economy is composed by three main blocks: households, firms and
monetary and fiscal authorities.
2.3.1 Households
Households are divided in two groups according to their impatience.
In steady state, the impatient group borrows from the patient one,
8This is of theoretical interest, since some DSGE models require an increase in
the real wage to drive consumption up.
9In particular, an issue in the literature has been represented by the co-
movement problem between the consumption of durable and non-durable goods.
This problem is analysed in the third chapter of the thesis.
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which is composed by so-called savers or lenders. Households can
be represented as a continuum over the (0,1) interval. Borrowers are
a fraction ω of total households while the remaining part is com-
posed by savers. The discount factor of borrowers is given by β
while savers discount utility by γ > β. This is a parsimonious way to
introduce heterogeneity within households, since higher impatience
in turn affects the first order conditions of households and makes
it more convenient for savers to lend and for borrowers to borrow
in steady state. In the following equations I solve the maximization
problem of the two groups, notice that the variables related to savers
are identified with a tilde. Both groups of households maximize a
similar utility function. Utility is a function of consumption Ct –
where h identifies the degree of habits in consumption – housing (Dt)
and labor efforts (Nt), which are separated for the two sectors c (non-
durable) and d (housing). The parameter η represents the elasticity of
substitution between housing and consumption, which I assume to
be equal to one in the baseline calibration, thus implying separability
between the two goods. For the specification of the disutility of labor
I follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and implicitly Horvath (2000). Al-
lowing the parameters ξ and ϕ to be positive reduces mobility across
sectors. In particular in the polar case in which ξ = 0, hours worked
in the two sector are perfectly substitutes.
(2.1)
E0
∞∑
t =0
γt
ln [(1− α)(C˜t − hC˜t−1) (η−1)η + αD˜ (η−1)ηt ] η(η−1)
− v˜
1 + ϕ
(
N˜
(1+ξ)
c,t + N˜
(1+ξ)
d,t
) (1+ϕ)
(1+ξ)
 ,
(2.2)
E0
∞∑
t =0
βt
ln [(1− α)(Ct − hCt−1) (η−1)η + αD (η−1)ηt ] η(η−1)
− v
1 + ϕ
(
N
(1+ξ)
c,t +N
(1+ξ)
d,t
) (1+ϕ)
(1+ξ)
 ,
The budget constraint of savers in real terms is somewhat richer
than that of borrowers, for savers can accumulate capital in both sec-
tors besides housing, they can lend to the governments by buying
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bonds, identified by bgt , and to borrowers, where I define loans with
bt. Savers earn a state contingent return Rt and Rbt on the two assets.
With a τ I indicate taxation on the variables of interest and with δ
the depreciation rates. Finally, qt is the relative price of housing, φt
represents convex adjustment costs for capital10 and Divt is a catch-
all variables which considers profits from monopolistic firms and
unions and transfers from government, if positive, or a lump-sum
tax if negative.
(1 + τc,t) C˜t + kc,t + kd,t + qh,t
(
D˜t − (1− δd)(1− τd,t)D˜t−1
)
+ b˜t + b
g
t
=
(1 + (1− τb,t)Rbt−1b˜t−1)
pit
+
(1 + (1− τg,t)Rt−1bgt−1)
pit
+
(
(1− τk,t)Rkt + 1− δkc
)
Kc,(t−1) +
(
1− τkd,t)Rkdt + 1− δkd
)
Kd,(t−1)
+ (1− τl,t)w˜c,tN˜c,t + (1− τl,t)w˜d,tN˜d,t − φt +Divt
(2.3)
The budget constraint of borrowers differs from that of savers for
borrowers do not accumulate capital and they do not invest in bonds.
This results in the variable bt representing credit obtained by savers
rather than loans. Finally, the variable Tt is transfers to borrowers
from the government.
(2.4)(1 + τc,t) Ct + qt (Dt − (1− δ) Dt−1 (1− τd,t)) +
Rbt−1 bt−1
pic,t
= bt + (1− τl,t) wc,tNc,t + (1− τl,t) wd,tNd,t + Tt
The differences between savers and borrowers are also given by
an additional constraint. Namely, borrowers can only get an amount
of loans that is tied to the value of their housing stock:
(2.5)bt =
(1− δ) (1− χ) DtEt{pic,t+1 qt+1 (1− τd,t+1) }
Rbt
Notice that the parameter χ represents the downpayment and
therefore (1− χ) is the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
10See Appendix B for its specification.
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Solving the maximization problem for savers, yields the follow-
ing first order conditions:
(2.6)λ˜t =
1−α
1+τc,t
C˜t − h C˜t−1
−
(1−α)h γ
1+τc,t+1
C˜t+1 − C˜t h
(2.7)
λ˜t
(
1 + φkc
(
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
))
= γ λ˜t+1
(
(1− τk,t) Rkt + 1− δk
+
(
Kt+1
Kt
− 1
)
φkc
(
Kt+1
Kt
− 1
))
λ˜t
(
1 + φkh
(
Kdt
Kdt−1
− 1
))
= γ λ˜t+1
(
1− δ + (1− τkd,t) Rkht
+
(
Kd,t+1
Kd,t
− 1
)
φkh
(
Kd,t+1
Kd,t
− 1
))
(2.8)
(2.9)λ˜t =
γ λ˜t+1 (1 + (1− τg,t+1) (Rt − 1))
pic,t+1
(2.10)λ˜t =
γ λ˜t+1
(
1 + (1− τb,t+1)
(
Rbt − 1
))
pic,t+1
(2.11)λ˜t qt =
α
D˜t
+ λ˜t+1 γ (1− δ) (1− τd,t+1) qt+1
The optimal conditions for the borrower are instead the following:
(2.12)λt =
1−α
1+τc,t
Ct − hCt−1 −
(1−α)hβ
1+τc,t+1
Ct+1 − hCt
(2.13)Rbt ψt = 1− β
λt+1
λt
Rbt
pic,t+1
qt λt =
α
Dt
+qt+1 λt+1 (1−τd,t+1) (1−δ) β+qt ψt λt (1−δ) (1−χ) pid,t+1
(2.14)
Two comments are in order. The first one is the presence of ψt in
equation (2.13), which is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing
72 Chapter 2. Fiscal Policy, Housing and Financial Frictions
constraint. In equilibrium ψt > 0, thus signalling the willingness of
borrowers to tilt their consumption choice towards the present but
the impossibility to do so due to the constraint. The borrowing con-
straint also affects equation (2.14), the first order condition with re-
spect to housing. Indeed, the third element on the right hand side
stems from the role that housing plays in borrowers’ optimization
problem, which is the additional use as collateral.
Households do not maximize utility also with respect to labor ef-
forts, rather they let unions contract their wage and then offer the
amount of labor requested by firms. Unions set the optimal wage
as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitutions of each group
of households. As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), I assume that there
are four different unions that serve the interests of the two groups of
households in the two different productive sectors of the economy.
Appendix B provides a detailed characterization of the problem.
2.3.2 Firms
In order to introduce price rigidity I assume that there is a distinction
between perfectly competitive final goods producers and the inter-
mediate sector, where firms enjoy a certain degree of monopolistic
power. Furthermore, the consumption good and housing sector are
modeled symmetrically. The technology employed in the intermedi-
ate sector is:
(2.15)Yc,t = (Nc,t + N˜c,t)(1−µc)k
µc
c,t−1
(2.16)Yd,t = (Nd,t + N˜d,t)(1−µd)k
µd
d,t−1
while the final goods producers’technology is represented by a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator11. Intermediate producers face quadratic
costs of adjusting prices a´ la Rotemberg12. The two following Phillips
Curves represent the result of the maximization problem in both sec-
tors:
1− εc + εcmcc,t = pic,t θc (pic,t − 1)− θc pic,t+1 Λ˜t+1
Λ˜t
Yc,t+1
Yc,t
(pic,t+1 − 1)
(2.17)
11The specification of the problem follows what has been outlined in the first
chapter, but for the introduction of capital
12Rotemberg (1982).
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1− εd + εdmcd,t = pid,t θd
(
pidt − 1
)− θd pidt+1 Λ˜t+1
Λ˜t
qt+1
qt
Yd,t+1
Yd,t
(pid,t+1− 1)
(2.18)
Appendix B also provides detailed first order conditions for the
problem. The introduction of capital, besides making the model more
realistic, finds its justification in dampening the importance of real
wage fluctuations. Indeed, as discussed at length by Bilbiie and
Straub (2004), a strong positive response of the real wage its crucial
in making consumption positively correlated to government spend-
ing. When labor is the only factor of production the importance of
movements in the real wage might be exaggerated, thus the intro-
duction of capital as a complementary factor of production helps in
obtaining more robust results.
2.3.3 Monetary Policy Rule
For the specification of the monetary policy rule and the calibra-
tion of γR and γpi, the parameters associated respectively to the lag-
response of the interest rate and to the response to inflation, I fol-
low Fernández-Villaverde (2010). The response of the interest rate
to changes in inflation is crucial in determining the dynamics of the
model and therefore some robustness checks are conducted and shown
in Appendix B.13 The Central Banks reacts only to inflation and the
Taylor rule features a certain degree in the persistence of the interest
rate, measured by the parameter γR.
(2.19)
Rt
R¯
=
(
Rt−1
R¯
)γR (pic,t
p¯i
)γpi(1−γR)
et
The variable et represents a monetary policy shock, which, as
common in this literature follows an autoregressive process of order
one.14
13Fernández-Villaverde (2010) does not discuss the reason why he chose a rela-
tively low value for the elasticity of the policy rate to inflation. Perhaps, the author
imagine a crisis scenario with a monetary authority following a very accomodative
stance. Given that in his baseline calibration is γR = 0.95 and γpi = 0.95, the pa-
rameter associated to inflation is 0.0475. Robustness checks show that increasing
the response to inflation reduces significantly the size of the multiplier.
14log (et) = ρpi log (et−1) + ut.
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2.3.4 Government Sector
Fiscal authorities have to abide to the following budget constraint:
(2.20)bgt = Tt + gt +
Rt−1 b
g
t−1
pic,t−1
− taxt
where, bgt is government debt, gt is public expenditure in terms
of the consumption good and Rt−1 is the contingent rate paid on
its debt. The government finances public expenditure and transfers
through the collection of taxes. Taxes are distortionary and given by
the following equation:
taxt = τc,t
(
Ct ω+ C˜t (1−ω)
)
+ N˜c,t w˜c,t τl,t + N˜d,t τl,t w˜d,t +Nc,t τl,twc,t
+Nd,t τl,twd,t + τg,t (Rt−1 − 1) bgt + bt τb,tbt
(
Rbt−1 − 1
)
+ τd,tD
tot
t +Kt−1 τk,t
(
Rkt−1 − δk
)
+Kdt−1 τkh,t
(
Rkht−1 − δd
)
(2.21)
Government expenditure fluctuates according to:
(2.22)gˆt = ρgg gˆt−1 + dg
bgt−1
pictYt
+ εg,t
where gˆ = log
(
gt
g¯
)
is the log deviation of inflation with respect
to its steady state value, while the parameter dg is the one measuring
the sensitivity of public expenditure to deviations of the ratio of the
public debt. Finally, εgg,t represents a shock to public expenditure.
The laws of motion for the tax rates defined in the model are all mod-
elled as autoregressive processes of order one, where εj ∼ N (0, στ,j)
(2.23)log
(
1 + τc,t
1 + τ¯c
)
= ρc log
(
1 + τc,t−1
1 + τ¯c
)
− ετc,t
(2.24)log
(
1− τl,t
1− τ¯l
)
= ρl log
(
1− τl,t−1
1− τ¯l
)
+ ετl,t
(2.25)log
(
1− τd,t
1− τ¯d
)
= ρd log
(
1− τd,t−1
1− τ¯d
)
+ ετd,t
(2.26)log
(
1− τg,t
1− τ¯g
)
= ρg log
(
1− τg,t−1
1− τ¯g
)
+ ετg,t
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(2.27)log
(
1− τb,t
1− τ¯b
)
= ρb log
(
1− τb,t−1
1− τ¯b
)
+ ετb,t
(2.28)log
(
1− τk,t
1− τ¯k
)
= ρk log
(
1− τk,t−1
1− τ¯k
)
+ ετk,t
(2.29)log
(
1− τkh,t
1− τ¯kh
)
= ρkh log
(
1− τkh,t−1
1− τ¯kh
)
+ ετkh,t
(2.30)log
(
Tt
T¯
)
= ρT log
(
Tt−1
T¯
)
+ εT,t
I use the above specification in section 2.5.2 in order to replicate
Fernández-Villaverde (2010)’s experiment aimed at assessing the type
of fiscal shock that has a stronger effect on impact on output. In the
remaining sections of the simulations I rely to an alternative specifi-
cation of the fiscal policy rule, and I follow a more consolidated tra-
dition in the literature. Namely, as in Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés
(2007) and Bilbiie and Straub (2004) I specify government deficit as:
(2.31)def. = g + T − tax
and the linear fiscal rule as:
(2.32)def. = gtφg + b
g
tφb
and therefore I do not consider equation (2.30) and replace the
law of motion of public expenditure with an autoregressive process
of order one:
(2.33)log
(
gt
g¯
)
= ρgg log
(
gt−1
g¯
)
+ uggt
I do this in order to follow as closely as possible the literature on
the topic, and provide the results that arise following the alternative
rule as robustness checks.
2.3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
Equilibrium in the consumption and in the housing sector requires:
(2.34)Yc,t = gt + Ct ω + C˜t (1− ω) + Yc,t θc
2
(pict − 1)2
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(2.35)
Yd,t =
(
Dt − (1− δ) Dt−1
(
1− τ dt
))
ω
+(1−ω)
(
D˜t−
(
1−τ dt
)
(1−δ) D˜t−1
)
+Yd,t
θd
2
(
pidt −1
)2
where the last element in both the above equations is the fraction
of output wasted in the process of adjusting prices. The equilibrium
in the labor market requires:
(2.36)Nc,t = Nc,t ω + N˜c,t (1− ω)
(2.37)Nd,t = Nd,t ω + N˜d,t (1− ω)
(2.38)N tott = ω (Nc,t +Nd,t) + (1− ω)
(
N˜c,t + N˜d,t
)
where Ni,t =
∫
Ni,t(j) dj, and j represents a continuum of firms
over the (0,1) interval. Total output is given by the sum of output
in the non-durable and in the durable sector15 plus business invest-
ment.
(2.39)Yt = Yc,t + qt Yd,t + Ic,t + Id,t
where:
(2.40)Ic,t + Id,t = Kt − (1− δk)Kt−1 +Kd,t − (1− δkd)Kd,t−1 − φt
Finally, the equilibrium in the credit market requires:
(2.41)btω = bt(1− ω)
2.4 Calibration
For the model has been built drawing mainly on two different pa-
pers, namely Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Fernández-Villaverde
(2010), also the calibration follows these two models as closely as
possible. In particular, the latter model has been used as the bench-
mark for the calibration of parameters related to the fiscal sector and
the monetary policy rule, while the former model has been used for
the remaining part. Most of the parameters are standard in the liter-
ature therefore I will mainly discuss those that are more specific to
15As standard in this literature, output in the durable sector is measured at con-
stant prices.
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this model. The calibration is based on the US economy, for I mainly
follow works that focus on the U.S. The parameter α, the share of
housing in the utility function, and the depreciation rate of housing
which has been set to 1% on a quarterly base, have been calibrated
to match a level of residential investment in steady state equal to 6%,
while the weight of the disutility of labor v˜ and v are group specific
and have been calibrated in order to pin down steady state level of
hours worked to 1/3 of households’ total time. The depreciation rate
of capital in the non-durable sector is set to 0.025, while the depreci-
ation rate of capital in the durable sector is slightly higher and equal
to 0.03.16 Those two parameters and the share of capital in the pro-
duction function, µc and µd have been used to pin down the total
share of investment over GDP to roughly 20%. Government debt
as a share of GDP, differently from Fernández-Villaverde (2010),17 is
equal to 60% in steady state, a value that is consistent with the aver-
age of US government debt as a share of GDP from 1990 to 2007. The
model features nominal rigidities both on the firms level and with
respect to wage setting. Prices are sticky only in the non-durable sec-
tor, and they can be reset on average once every four quarters. House
prices are flexible, this assumption is not without consequences,18
but the largest part of the literature on the topic agrees on consid-
ering it quite sensible. Wages are instead sticky in both sectors and
they are reset on average once a year. The downpayment χ is set
to 0.24, thus implying a LTV ratio of 76%, in line with the estimates
for the U.S..19 The share of borrowers is equal to 0.5 while habits
in consumption parameter is equal to 0.6, a value found in many
estimated models. I follow Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) in
setting the share of government expenditure to GDP to 20% , which
was roughly the post-war years average in the U.S.. As in Fernández-
Villaverde (2010) the steady state values are equal to 0.05 for the con-
sumption tax, 0.2 for the labor tax and 0.32 for the tax on savings. For
16The reason behind this difference has to be found in the lower service life of
construction machineries, see Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for more details.
17In his model debt is zero in steady state.
18See Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) on the topic, especially with respect to
the importance of modelling prices as sticky in the durable sector for the conduct of
monetary policy. See also the third chapter for an in depth analysis of the problem.
19See Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) for an empirical account of different
LTV ratios in advanced economies.
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the calibration of the property tax on housing I follow Alpanda and
Zubairy (2013) and set it to 0.0035, which corresponds to an annual
rate of 1.4%20. An important parameter is dg, the response of govern-
ment expenditure to changes in the level of public debt. Following
Fernández-Villaverde (2010), this parameter has been set to −0.001.
Its relatively small value makes variation of government expenditure
in the short run not strongly affected by variations in government
debt, while its sign makes the model stable. Finally the autoregres-
sive processes have all a persistence of 0.95, which is standard given
the quarterly frequency of the model. When I use the alternative
specification of the fiscal rule, I use as baseline values of 0.1 for the
sensitivity of deficit to government expenditure and a value of 0.3
for the sensitivity of deficit to changes in the level of debt.
20The authors calibrate this figure using the 50-State Property Tax Comparison
Study conducted by the Minnesota Taxpayers Association (2011).
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TABLE 2.1: Parameters
Parameter Name Value Description
γ 0.99 Discount factor of Savers
β 0.98 Discount factor of Borrowers
δd 0.01 Rate of depreciation of housing
δkc 0.025 Rate of depreciation of Capital in C
δkd 0.03 Rate of depreciation of Capital in D
εc 7.5 Elasticity of substitution for C goods
εd 7.5 Elasticity of substitution for D goods
εwc 7.5 Elasticity of substitution labor in C
εwd 7.5 Elasticity of substitution labor in D
χ 0.24 Downpayment
γR 0.95 Taylor rule smoothing
γpi 0.95 Taylor rule sensitivity to inflation
ω 0.5 Share of Borrowers
h 0.6 Habits in consumption paramter
ξ 0.871 Elasticity of substitution across labor types
φ 0.5 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
ρτ 0.95 Autoregressive coefficient in tax shocks
dg -0.001 Sensitivity of expenditure to debt
φb 0.3 Sensitivity of deficit to debt
φg 0.1 Sensitivity of deficit to gov. exp.
τ¯c 0.05 Steady state value of cons. tax
τ¯l 0.2 Steady state value of labor tax
τ¯d 0.0035 Steady state value of house tax
τ¯b 0.32 Steady state value of tax on savings
g¯ 20% Share of gov.expenditure
b¯g 60% Steady state level of public debt
φkc 14.25 Adjusting cost parameter, capital C
φkd 14.25 Adjusting cost parameter, capital D
µc 0.39 Capital share C
µd 0.39 Capital share D
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2.5 Experiments and Simulations
In the following sections I run several simulations related to the im-
plementation of fiscal policy. I use the model as a laboratory to get
intuitions on the transmission of fiscal policy to the economy in pres-
ence of financial frictions and housing. Section 2.5.1 shows how the
model responds to a one percent increase in government expendi-
ture and it argues that the presence of constrained borrowers alters
the dynamics of the model and that fiscal policy has short-term re-
distributional consequences, this is clear when the responses of the
two groups of households are compared. Section 2.5.2 shows what
is the effect on impact of five different fiscal shocks. More in details,
it compares what is the response of the model on impact given that
they all impose the same increase in the budget deficit. Finally, sec-
tion 2.5.3, illustrates what are the effects of varying the LTV ratio,
therefore showing the implications of different values of one of the
institutional characteristic of the credit market. This exercise is inter-
esting not only because economies around the world have different
LTV ratios but also for two additional reasons. The first one is that
LTV ratios are not exogenous, but rather change across the business
cycle, therefore implying potentially stronger or weaker effects of fis-
cal policy on the economy and on the different households’ groups.
The second one is that an analysis of the effect of LTV ratios adds to
the debate on its adoption as an instrument in the context of macro-
prudential policies.
2.5.1 Government Expenditure
In this section I simulate a positive shock to government expendi-
ture. Remember that in this model government expenditure is mod-
elled as being simply directed towards consumption of non-durable
goods.21 The shock is debt financed, and repaid in the medium term
by an increase in taxes. The overall effect of the shock is expansion-
ary: output increases on aggregate given the increase in both sectors,
inflation raises and the Central Bank reacts following the Taylor rule
21Therefore, I abstract from the possibility of the government to invest in hous-
ing or in productive capital.
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by raising the policy rate. Residential investment is not crowded
out by government sector expenditure, it actually increases more
than consumption, bringing about an increase in the relative price of
housing. Overall the fiscal multiplier is equal to 1.64.22 The value of
the multiplier is affected in particular by the value of φg in the fiscal
rule.23 Furthermore, given the relative small scale of the model, my
primary goal is not to suggest a precise measure for the multiplier.
FIGURE 2.1: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
It is interesting to go behind the aggregate results and dig deeper
as the model can give us useful information with respect to the trans-
mission of fiscal policy.
As figure 2.2 makes clear, the reaction to the initial shock of savers
and borrowers is quite different. Differently from models that rely
on rule of thumbers, here both agents in the model are consumption
smoother, however their reaction is at odds. Let me first examine
the reaction of savers. The increase in government expenditure cor-
responds to a negative wealth effect for them, because given Ricar-
dian equivalence agents know that they will have to face an increase
22The IRFs in the figures show the increase of output to a one percent increase
of government expenditure from its steady state value. Since the model is linear
and government expenditure in steady state is 20% of total output the multiplier
is higher than one and equal to 1.64.
23Therefore Appendix B provides some robustness checks and some additional
considerations with respect to this value.
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in taxes in the future that compensates the initial shock in govern-
ment expenditure. Savers react by increasing labor efforts and re-
ducing housing consumption, while they also decrease consumption
of non-durable goods, which at its through declines by 0.2%. Note
however, that consumption increases marginally in the first period
after the shock, a result that is probably given by the initial increase
in real house prices which entails a substitution effect from hous-
ing to consumption. The response of borrowers is completely dif-
ferent. Borrowers exploit the fact that the increase in government
expenditure brings about an increase in inflation therefore reducing
their real value of debt, this corresponds to a relaxation of their bor-
rowing constraint and they react by increasing both the consumption
of non-durable goods and that of housing. The increase in housing
consumption is so strong that compensates the reduction of hous-
ing consumption by savers. This increases house prices, but differ-
ently from savers house prices dynamics have a positive effect for
borrowers since their spike increases the value of their collateral and
therefore works as an additional channel that allows them to further
increase consumption.
FIGURE 2.2: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
As shown in Appendix B, the IRFs of the model if we consider
a shock in one of the distortionary tax rate are different in terms of
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magnitude but do not differ much qualitatively. The main differ-
ence is given by savers consumption of non-durable and the way
they rearrange consumption in the durable and non-durable sector.
For example, the increase in consumption is higher when there is
a reduction of taxes on consumption and the reduction of housing
consumption is lower when the expansionary measure is given by a
reduction in τd. In the next section I show and confront the effect of
shocking different tax rates and compare them with public expendi-
ture.
2.5.2 Fiscal Shocks
In order to study what kind of fiscal shock has the strongest effect on
total output, I conduct an experiment following closely the one pre-
sented by Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and in order to do so I consid-
ering the same modellization of the fiscal side proposed in that paper.
I study then the response at impact of total output, consumption and
residential investment after a shock to government expenditure and
to other 4 shocks to taxes, namely a tax on consumption, a tax on la-
bor, a tax on debt and a tax on housing.24 It is not straightforward to
decide how to confront those different shocks. Indeed two kinds of
problems emerge, the first one is if we should consider the effect on
impact of the shock, or rather its medium term effect or its welfare
related implications, that in this model, differently from Fernández-
Villaverde (2010) are even more complicated because of the presence
of two distinct classes of households. The second one is related to
the problems in calibrating the shocks in a way that would allow
one to compare them in the most informative way. These problems
have been solved in the above mentioned paper by confronting the
effect of the different shocks on impact and by calibrating the shocks
in order to consider the same effect on the public balance as the one
caused by an increase of one percent of public expenditure. That is
also the approach I take in this study. More formally, this calibration
is performed considering the following:
24Note that the original experiment by Fernández-Villaverde (2010) is limited to
output and as specified earlier it uses the financial accelerator related to firms net
worth.
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(2.42)0.01× g¯ = −∆τl,t × (N˜c,t w˜c,t + N˜d,t w˜d,t +Nc,twc,t +Nd,twd,t)
∆τl,t = −0.01 g¯×(N˜c,t w˜c,t + N˜d,t w˜d,t +Nc,twc,t +Nd,twd,t)
where I use as an explicative example the way I calibrated the size
of the shock on labor efforts. Namely, I impose that the variation in
public expenditure, which puts a strain on government deficit equal
to a one percent of the steady state value of g is equal to an equivalent
temporary increase in the budget given in this case by a reduction in
labor taxes.25
Now, considering that the percent deviation of labor tax on im-
pact is given by τˆl:
(2.43)τˆl = log
(
1− τl
1− τ¯l
)
and that I want it to decrease it by the amount specified above,
then:
τˆl = log
(
1− τl −∆τl.t
1− τ¯l
)
= log
(
1− ∆τl,t
1− τ¯l
)
= log
(
1 + 0.01
1
1− τl,t
g¯
×(N˜c,t w˜c,t + N˜d,t w˜d,t +Nc,twc,t +Nd,twd,t)
)
I follow the same procedure to calibrate all other shocks and then
examine the impulse response functions. The main result, which
confirms the one of Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and that can be red
from figure 2.3, is that the fiscal shock that works better in increasing
output on impact is an increase in government expenditure. Indeed,
the multiplier of all other shocks is somewhat smaller than that im-
plied by a positive increase in gt. While the overall effect is similar for
all kinds of shocks, there is a different response in residential invest-
ment and aggregate consumption. What however emerges clearly
25Note that all the values considered in those computations are the steady state
values.
2.5. Experiments and Simulations 85
from this analysis is that fiscal policy in presence of constrained agents,
despite the source of the shock, crowds in residential investment and
consumption and ultimately increases total output. The overall effect
is stronger for the government expenditure shock, with a multiplier
that is about 0.5% larger with respect to all other shocks.
FIGURE 2.3: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
As highlighted in the fourth panel of figure 2.3, an important
channel through which the model works is through the increase in
inflation, this effect is stronger after a shock to government expendi-
ture which directly increases aggregate demand. The mechanism I
refer to is debt-deflation, which comes from Fisher’s account of the
Great Depression and in the context of monetary policy has been
already highlighted in different set-ups by (Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist, 1999) and in a model similar to the one here presented by
(Iacoviello, 2005). Indeed, debt in this model is nominal and an in-
crease of inflation decreases its value.26 This works through the relax-
ation of borrowers budget constraint that goes in the same direction
of an increase in house prices. Therefore, it boosts their consumption
of non-durable goods and of housing.
Figure 2.4 shows the way the two distinct groups react to the
shocks and helps shading some lights on the aggregate results. The
26The original analysis of Fisher was more focused on the effect of deflation on
the magnification of debt.
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figure highlights once again that households react differently to the
shocks. A reduction in the tax rate on consumption has the second
strongest effect on aggregate output and it works mainly through
an increase in consumption. However, the incentive to consump-
tion lowers investment with respect to a shock to government ex-
penditure and is furthermore hindered by the presence of habits in
consumption. The reduction of housing taxes has also expansionary
effects, which differently from the previous shock rely more on the
higher increase in housing consumption by borrowers. Interestingly
enough, savers still reduce their housing consumption, due to the
increase in real house prices, however their consumption of durable
goods gets back to steady state far more quicker than in other shock
exercises, and it overshoots dramatically after that. A reduction of
taxes on savings increases savings by patient households. Indeed,
that is reflected in figure 2.4 by the strong decline in housing con-
sumption by them and by the opposite movement in the consump-
tion of housing by borrowers. The two effects tend to compensate
each other, while the effect on non-durable consumption is more lim-
ited therefore the reduction of this tax rate is the least effective be-
tween the ones analysed. Lastly, a reduction in the tax on labor does
not manage to have effects on total output that are as stronger as in
the case of government expenditure shock. One reason might be re-
lated to the fact that this tax shock shifts households labor supply,
therefore has limited effects on inflation.
This section highlights how different the reactions of the two groups
of households are. However, the focus of the model is not on the wel-
fare effect of fiscal shocks, for the analysis would also require to take
a stance on the effect of government expenditure on the utility of
households. This issue has not been tackled in this paper and since
the empirical evidence on this topic is still mixed I omit any further
discussion on the topic and leave it to future research.
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FIGURE 2.4: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
2.5.3 Institutional Characteristics
The last part of the results, focuses on the effect of fiscal policy in
light of different institutional characteristics.27 In particular, in this
section I explore the effects of changing the LTV ratio, which level
usually differs across countries and across time, reflecting charac-
teristic of the credit market that are distinctive of the economy un-
der analysis. This topic has been studied with reference to mone-
tary policy by Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) among others. In
that paper, the authors first provide empirical evidence of the dif-
ferent characteristic of the mortgage market in advanced economies,
focusing on the LTV ratio and on the flexibility of the interest rate
in the contract, and then use a DSGE model similar to the one de-
scribed here to confirm their empirical results. Both their empirical
and theoretical analysis reaches the conclusion that in presence of
a higher LTV ratio, and therefore when financial markets are more
developed, monetary policy has stronger effects on output and in-
vestment. Discussions related to the LTV are not just confined to a
broad analysis of the degree of development of financial markets.
Indeed, the LTV ratio has been already adopted by several countries
27Note that in this section the specification of the fiscal side is similar to Gali,
López-Salido, and Vallés (2007). I provide as usual the results for the alternative
specification in the Appendix B.
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as a macro-prudential tool. The reason for that is straightforward,
LTV ratios are pro-cyclical, for mainly two reasons. The first one
comes directly from the appreciation of assets during expansions,
and the second is due to the apparent receding risk and increase
in competition that usually goes hand in hand with a boom (Borio
and Shim, 2007). It follows, that authorities could use the LTV ra-
tio in order to steer the business cycle. On aggregate, LTV ratios
tend to be higher in booms rather than in a contraction. However,
if we consider the case of households that run up consistent amount
of debt in face of the increasing value of their properties, a sudden
drop in house prices, leaves them strongly leveraged, and therefore
with higher LTV ratios. The aim of this section is to check whether
different level of households indebtedness impinge on the transmis-
sion of fiscal policy. To do so, I consider a shock to government ex-
penditure as in section 2.5.1 and three different levels for the LTV,
namely 60, 75 (which is a figure almost identical to the baseline used
in the model) and 90. All the values are plausible since they span
the range of LTV identified by the literature. Figure 2.5 shows how
the model dynamics are affected by different levels of the LTV ratio.
In particular, notice that both the responses of borrowers and savers
to the shock, despite qualitatively unchanged, are magnified by an
increase in its value. The reasons for this result is straightforward
and works mainly through borrowers, while the reaction of savers
is, to some extent, a reaction to changes in the behaviour of borrow-
ers. A higher LTV increases the amount of resources that borrowers
can actually borrow out of their housing stock value. The higher bor-
rowing capacity reflects itself in higher consumption of both durable
and non-durable goods. Interestingly, as it can be seen in figure 2.6,
this change does not affect households labor supplies and wages, if
not marginally and after some periods, these dynamics are key to
understand what happens on aggregate. An increase in government
expenditure, as already shown in the previous sections, has an ex-
pansionary effect. The increase in output brings also inflation up.
The increase in inflation relaxes the borrowing constraint of borrow-
ers through the Fisher effect and this pushes up their consumption
of durable and non durable goods. The increase in residential invest-
ment pushes house prices up and this feeds back into the borrowing
2.5. Experiments and Simulations 89
constraint once again, further increasing the consumption possibili-
ties of borrowers through an increase of their housing value. Those
effects are magnified by a higher LTV ratio. However, the overall ef-
fect on total output, consumption and residential investment is very
little affected by the mechanism so far highlighted. This is some-
how surprising, and the explanation is in the highlighted dynamics
in the labor market and in the consequent reaction by savers. In-
deed, savers reduce the consumption of housing, given the relative
increase in house prices but increase the consumption of non-durable
goods. Savers’ response mirrors the one of borrowers, but in the op-
posite direction. This reduces the overall effect of the shock on the
aggregates, indeed total output is only marginally affected, while is
slightly more evident the increase in total consumption and the cor-
responding reduction in housing investment when the LTV ratio is
higher.
FIGURE 2.5: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
This result is interesting for it suggests that fiscal policy is more
redistributive the higher is the level of debt that borrowers hold with
respect to their housing stock value. However, despite the high sen-
sitivity of borrowers to fiscal policy, and the increasing sensitivity
they show with respect to the LTV ratio, it cannot be concluded that
higher LTV ratios imply a larger responsiveness of the economy to
fiscal policy. This result might underline also some limitations of the
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model, and in particular the presence of a more detailed modelliza-
tion of firms might revert or amplify some of the conclusions reached
here.
FIGURE 2.6: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
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2.6 Further extension, limitation
An interesting extension of the model would be to consider a more
detailed modellization of the public sector. This would allow the ex-
ploration of further shocks and it would facilitate the application of
the model to contexts that are different from the ones analysed in
this work. In particular, it could be taken into account the possibility
for the government to invest in housing and in capital. Creating an
alternative channel through which the government can intervene on
the economy would most likely alter the effect of fiscal policy on the
business cycle. Another interesting application of the model might
be that of assessing the effects of fiscal consolidation. During the re-
cent sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area, in particular the Greek
government has been forced to reduce the size of the public sec-
tor by laying-off part of the employees in the public administration
or by reducing their wages. There are not may papers that rely to
DSGE models to analyse the issue of fiscal consolidation. Carvalho
and Martins (2011) investigate the topic trying to understand if the
composition of fiscal consolidation is important. They do so without
considering financial frictions, and therefore it might be interesting
to study their effect in that kind of framework. Another possible fur-
ther extension of the model might be to study optimal policy. In this
work I did not take any stance on the redistributional effects of fiscal
policy, and studying optimal fiscal policy might shed some lights on
this topic. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare different
taxations in that context.
2.7 Conclusion
The Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, both
underscored although for different reasons, the importance of fiscal
policy. Indeed, on the one hand some governments used fiscal policy
as an additional tool to revitalize their economies, on the other hand,
the higher level of public debt, especially in Europe forced some gov-
ernments to slash expenditure and increase taxes. Both episodes
highlight the need to understand in full how fiscal policy affects
macroeconomic variables and the magnitude of its effect, namely the
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size of the fiscal multiplier. This work has tried to contribute to the
literature interested in assessing the role and the scope of fiscal pol-
icy by resorting to a DSGE model with financial frictions. While the
role of financial frictions, especially in the form of a collateral con-
straint tied to the value of households’ housing stock, has been ex-
tensively explored in the literature with respect to a monetary policy
shock, this is not the case with respect to fiscal policy. In this paper
I simulated some fiscal shocks and tried to shed some lights on the
transmission of fiscal policy and its short run implications. My main
findings are that constrained households react very differently from
unconstrained ones. In particular, constrained households increase
their consumption of durable and non-durable goods in light of an
increase in government expenditure while the negative wealth ef-
fect arising from the expansionary shock brings about a reduction in
savers’ consumption. Furthermore, following Fernández-Villaverde
(2010), I compare four different tax shocks to the government expen-
diture shock, finding that on impact an increase in public expendi-
ture has the strongest effect on output. Finally, I consider changes in
the LTV ratio and analyse the resulting IRFs. I find that borrowers
that can enjoy higher LTV ratios respond more strongly to a fiscal
shock. The opposite is true for savers and this, coupled with a very
small response in labor and wage setting decisions, brings about only
modest changes to the total level of output.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the behavior of DSGE models with durable
goods. In particular, it seeks to replicate some of the results that
have been documented in the literature to amend a baseline model
with durable goods and nominal price rigidity. In this model, when
durable goods prices are flexible, a co-movement problem between
consumption of durable and non durable goods arises following a
monetary policy shock. I will show how, contrary to what argued by
Monacelli (2009), financial frictions, in the form of a collateral con-
straint tied to the value of durables, do not solve this problem, while
wage stickiness is much more effective in reconciling theoretical with
empirical evidence. Furthermore, I will add on the literature by ar-
guing that a simple model that includes durables as collateral, like
the one presented in Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013), is not able
to overcome the co-movement problem, contrary to what reported in
that paper. This reverts an important conclusion of that study, that
increasing the loan to value ratio magnifies the impact of a mone-
tary policy shock. I will finally show that for those results to hold it
suffices to introduce wage stickiness in the model.
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3.1 Introduction
In this paper I will focus on the behavior of DSGE models with durable
goods. In particular, I will try to replicate some of the results that
have been documented in the literature, and in doing so I will to re-
visit the debate triggered by Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007). In
this AER paper, the authors showed that in the presence of durable
goods, different combinations of relative price stickiness in the two
sectors have strong effects on the final behavior of the model in re-
sponse to a monetary policy shock. In particular, they stress how
under flexible prices in the durable sector a co-movement problem,
arises. Namely, after a monetary policy tightening the non-durable
sector contracts while the durable sector expands. A consequence of
this is that monetary policy becomes neutral in the short run. These
results, which are at odds with empirical evidence, can be accounted
for from a theoretical point of view, but they also underline the ne-
cessity to amend the baseline DSGE model with durable goods in
order to reconcile theoretical and empirical results.
Different solutions have been proposed to this puzzle. In this work
I replicate a simple DSGE model with durable goods and analyse
some of them. In particular, I focus on the introduction of financial
frictions, wage stickiness and adjustment costs of investment. These
features are all of particular interest with respect to models featuring
durable goods. This exploration led me to revisit some results that
were taken for granted in the literature.
In particular, Monacelli (2009) argued that introducing financial fric-
tions, in the form of a borrowing constraint, goes in the direction of
solving the co-movement problem, despite the degree of flexibility in
the durable sector. However, by using the same model, Sterk (2010)
proves that the introduction of this particular source of friction actu-
ally makes it even more difficult to solve the co-movement problem.
The reason for this is strictly related to the simplistic way the labor
market is modeled and calls for the presence of further ingredients
to reconcile theoretical and empirical evidence. As documented by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010), three elements seem to make a good job
in order to have DSGE models with durable goods replicate the em-
pirical observations. Those elements are adjustment costs in housing
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investment, to mitigate the strong effect of a monetary policy shock
on investment, habit in consumption to replicate the hump shaped
response of aggregate consumption, and wage stickiness. The latter
feature is crucial to break down the co-movement problem.
In their analysis Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010) do not tackle the issue
of financial frictions. This leaves open a question related to the im-
portance of this source of credit impairment in a DSGE model. Kim
and Oh (2014) try to answer this question by introducing wage stick-
iness in the set-up sketched by Monacelli (2009). They conclude that
the presence of this further nominal rigidity suffices to argue that
borrowing constraints magnify the effect of a monetary policy shock.
The introduction of durable goods in DSGE models most frequently
goes hand in hand with the departure from perfect financial mar-
kets – well captured by the representative agent framework – and
the move towards the analysis of economies characterized by fric-
tions in the credit debit relationships between heterogeneous agents.
This literature stretches back to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), who pio-
neered an approach based on the introduction of durable goods used
as collateral by borrowers in order to obtain loans from less impatient
savers.
Thinking about durable goods and their use as collateral, means to
a first approximation to think about the residential sector, given that
housing is by far the most important durable good in national ac-
counting. The importance of considering the housing sector in theo-
retical models is magnified on the one hand by the empirical consid-
eration that this sector is very sensitive to interest rate movements,
and on the other by the fact that housing accounts for a large share
not only of GDP but also of households’ wealth.1 Furthermore, the
recent financial crisis gave new impetus to an already lively litera-
ture. In light of those considerations, models with a stronger em-
pirical flavour explicitly refer to housing rather than adopting the
broader label of durable goods.
Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2004) propose a model along the
lines of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) in which households
1Housing constitutes about 50% of households’ wealth and housing wealth has
been on average 1.5 the size of GDP in the period 1952− 2008 (Iacoviello, 2010).
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can lower the cost of credit by using their housing stock as collateral.
They find that this form of financial friction increases the sensitiv-
ity of the economy to a monetary policy shock2. Iacoviello (2005)
estimates a DSGE model with borrowers and savers and an hous-
ing sector. In this model entrepreneurs, as well as borrowers, can
run up debt up to the value of their housing stock value. Debt is
nominal and a change in asset prices following a shock has strong
repercussions on the real economy. Using a similar model, Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) analyse the spillovers from the housing sector to the
US economy over a 40 years period, concluding that they are signif-
icant, especially on consumption. Evidence on the degree of price
stickiness in the durable sector is mixed but it tends to indicate that
prices are more flexible in the housing sector. Indeed, house prices
are usually negotiated among the parties, therefore it is difficult to
justify any degree of stickiness in this sector. As a result, most of the
models that deal theoretically with the presence of housing consider
flexible prices in the housing (durable) sector and sticky prices in the
non durable one.
The second main feature considered in this paper is nominal wage
stickiness, which is introduced in several DSGE models to account
for the variation of macroeconomic variables in response to shocks.
In particular, as highlighted by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) wage stickiness might be even more important that price stick-
iness to replicate the observed persistence in output and sluggish re-
sponse in inflation following a monetary policy shock.
The remainder of this paper is as follows, in the first section I
present the results of a standard DSGE model with durable goods.
Then, I compare those results with a standard model that includes
financial frictions. In order to do so I follow closely Monacelli (2009),
who presents a simple model with durable goods and financial fric-
tions. In the following sections I discuss if the presence of financial
frictions suffices to solve the co-movement problem. In doing so, I
rely on the analysis provided by Sterk (2010). In the other sections
I add wage stickiness, adjusting costs of investment in the durable
sector and habits in consumption separately, in order to see if it is
2Their model does not feature borrowers and savers, in fact heterogeneity in
households is given by the presence of rule of thumb consumers.
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possible to reconcile models with durable goods with conventional
wisdom and to gauge the importance of each single friction. In or-
der to do so I follow the work by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010), who
add those features in a standard model with durable goods and Kim
and Oh (2014) who consider wage stickiness in the framework pro-
posed by Monacelli (2009). I then reconsider the difference between
a model with financial frictions and the representative agent model
in light of the presence of wage stickiness.
In the final section, I revisit the results of a paper that is strictly re-
lated to Monacelli (2009). Indeed, in a very influential paper, Calza,
Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) provide empirical evidence of how in-
stitutional characteristics affect the response of the economy to a mon-
etary policy shock. By institutional characteristics the authors mean
some characteristics related to the mortgage contract and in particu-
lar the size of the loan to value (LTV) ratio and the duration of the
mortgage contract. They consider more developed financial mar-
kets those where contractual rates are flexible and the LTV ratio is
higher, and find that financial development goes hand in hand with
stronger effects of monetary policy shocks to the economy. The au-
thors also rationalize their empirical findings through a DSGE model
which is in spirit very close to the one presented in Monacelli (2009).
They show that an increase in the LTV ratio magnifies the response
of monetary policy shock also in their theoretical set-up. However,
I show that, on the contrary, increasing the size of the loan to value
does not seem to magnify further the effect of a tightening in mon-
etary policy in their very model. The reason has to be found in the
co-movement problem and in the discussion laid out in the rest of
this work. For their result to hold I finally show that one solution is
the introduction of wage stickiness.
3.2 A DSGE Model with Durable Goods
In order to build a DGSE model with durable goods I follow Mona-
celli (2009), who presents a simple DSGE model that is well suited for
our analysis, for it departs from the standard New-Keynesian model
only for the presence of durable goods.
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There is a continuum of households over the (0,1) interval di-
vided in two distinct groups. The separation of households is driven
by their impatience. A fraction ω of households are considered bor-
rowers and have a discount factor β which is lower than the discount
factor γ of the remaining fraction of households (1− ω).
Borrowers: The less patient agents in the model, maximize the fol-
lowing utility function over consumption of non-durable goods Ct,
durable goods Dt and labor efforts Nt:
(3.1)E0
∞∑
t =0
βt
(
log[(1− α)(Ct)
(η−1)
η + αD
(η−1)
η
t ]
η
(η−1) − v N
(1+ϕ)
t
(1 + ϕ)
)
,
with 0 < β < 1 and where α represents the share of durable
goods in the utility function, ϕ is the inverse of the wage elasticity
of labor supply, η the elasticity of substitution between durable and
non-durable goods and v the weight of labor in the utility function.
Borrowers’ budget constraint in real term is given by:
Ct + qh,t(Dt − (1− δ)Dt−1) + Rt−1bt−1
pit
= bt + wtNt + Tt (3.2)
furthermore, the amount that they can borrow is tied to the ex-
pected value of their durable stock:
bt =
(1− χ)(1− δ)Et{Dtqt+1pit+1}
Rt
(3.3)
In the equations above wt is real wage, Tt are transfers, bt is real
debt, χ is the downpayment and therefore (1 − χ) reads as the loan
to value ratio, qt is the relative price of durable goods pit is inflation
in the non durable sector and Rt the gross nominal rate.
First order conditions with respect to Nt, Dt and Ct reads:
−Un,t
Uc,t
= wt (3.4)
qtUc,t = Ud,t + β(1− δ)Et{Uc,t+1qt+1}+ (1−χ)(1− δ)Uc,tqtψtEt{pid,t+1}
(3.5)
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Rtψt = 1− βEt
{Uc,t+1
Uc,t
Rt
pit+1
}
(3.6)
where Un,t, Uc,t and Ud,t are marginal utilities, while ψ is the ratio
of the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing to the budget constraint.
Savers: Patient households face a very similar problem, with the
only difference given by the absence of a borrowing constraint. They
maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
γt
(
log[(1− α)(C˜t)
(η−1)
η + αD˜
(η−1)
η
t ]
η
(η−1) − v˜ N˜
(1+ϕ)
t
(1 + ϕ)
)
(3.7)
with 0 < β < 1 subject to:
C˜t + qh,t(D˜t − (1− δ)D˜t−1 + Rt−1b˜t−1
pit
= b˜t + wtN˜t +
Πt
(1− ω) (3.8)
where Πt are profits coming from monopolistically competitive
firms, which are owned by savers. First order conditions are:
−U˜n,t
U˜c,t
= wt (3.9)
qtU˜c,t = U˜d,t + β(1− δ)Et{U˜c,t+1qt+1} (3.10)
Rt = 1− βEt
{ U˜c,t+1
U˜c,t
Rt
pit+1
}
(3.11)
While I assume a competitive frictionless labor market, and there-
fore the labor supply looks similar for both households groups, this
is not true for the other two first order conditions. Consider the
Euler equations first (3.6 and 3.11). The presence of ψt in the bor-
rower’s equation ensures that the consumption profile of borrowers
is tilted towards the present. Namely, marginal utility of current con-
sumption is higher than the expected marginal utility at time t + 1.
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Therefore, if they could, borrowers would expand current consump-
tion.3 The other difference is in the first order condition with respect
to Dt. Also in this case, borrower’s equation features an additional
term: (1− χ)(1− δ)Uc,tqtψtEt{pid,t+1}, which stems from the fact that
durable goods do not only provide utility for their fruition but also
from the fact that can be used as collateral. Interestingly, notice that
the right-hand-side of equation 3.5 can be also read as the shadow
value of durables.
Firms : the firms sector is composed by competitive goods produc-
ers and intermediate firms that enjoy a certain degree of monopolis-
tic power. The level of market power is measured by the elasticity of
substitution (εi, i = (c, d)) in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, which is
the technology used by final goods producers. The problem is stan-
dard and it is symmetric in both sectors. Intermediate goods pro-
ducer face quadratic costs of adjusting prices following Rotemberg
(1982). Optimality conditions in the two sectors boil down to the
two following Phillip’s Curves:
(1− εc) + εcmcc,t = ϑc(pit − 1)− ϑc
[Λ˜t+1
Λ˜t
Yc,t+1
Yc,t
(pit+1 − 1)pit+1
]
(3.12)
(1− εd) + εdmcd,t = ϑd(pit − 1)− ϑc
[Λ˜t+1
Λ˜t
qt+1
qt
Yd,t+1
Yd,t
(pid,t+1 − 1)pid,t+1
]
(3.13)
where mci are real marginal costs in the two sectors, and given
that labor is the only input of production (e.g. Yi,t = Ni,t) they equal
the real wage4. Λt is the stochastic discount factor of savers, given
that they own firms, and ϑi is the price adjustment cost parameter.
Notice that since the model is solved taking a log-linear approxima-
tion of the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady
state the Calvo-Yun model and the Rotemberg model are equivalent.
3Notice that, differently from rule-of-thumb consumers (as in Gali, López-
Salido, and Vallés (2007)), constrained borrowers are still rational-forward looking
agents.
4More precisely, wt in the non-durable sector and wt/qt in the durable one.
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Equilibrium Conditions: Market clearings are given by the follow-
ing equations:
Yc,t = ωCt + (1− ω)C˜t + ϑc
2
(pi − 1)2Yc,t (3.14)
Yd,t = ω(Dt− (1− δ)Dt−1) + (1−ω)(D˜t− (1− δ)D˜t−1) + ϑd
2
(pi− 1)2Yd,t
(3.15)
Yc,t + Yd,t = ωNt + (1− ω)N˜t (3.16)
ωBt = (1− ω)B˜t (3.17)
where Bt is nominal debt.
Monetary Policy : The central bank follows a simple Taylor Rule of
this form: R/R¯ = (pi/p¯i)φpiet;, where et is a shock that evolves accord-
ing to a simple AR(1) process.
3.2.1 Calibration
The model is parameterized following the baseline calibration in Mona-
celli (2009). Table 3.2.1 provides the value for the parameters used,
which are all somewhat standard in this literature. The parameter α
in the utility function is calibrated in order to have a share of durable
goods of 20% over GDP in steady state, while v and v˜ are calibrated
in order to have workers in steady-state working 1/3 of their time.5
Finally, parameters ϑc and ϑd are set in order to replicate different
scenarios of price stickiness. Notice also that a value of η = 1 en-
tails that consumption choices take the form of a Cobb-Douglas, and
therefore the presence of the log operator in equation 3.1 ensures that
housing and consumption are separable in the utility function.
5 This means that the two parameters are different for borrowers and savers
given the difference marginal utility in steady state. As noted by Monacelli (2009),
this means that effective hours worked between the two agents will differ to make
sure that they work for the chosen share of their total available time.
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TABLE 3.1: Calibrated Parameters - Chapter III model 1
Param. name Value Description
ϕ 1 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
γ 0.99 Discount factor saver
β 0.98 Discount factor borrower
δ 0.01 Depreciation rate durables
εc 6 Elas. subst. between non-durables
εd 6 Elas. subst. between durables
χ 0.25 Down-payment
φpi 1.5 Response to inflation in Taylor Rule
ρpi 0.5 Shock persistence
ω 0.5 Share of borrowers
η 1 El. sub. between durables and non-durables
3.2.2 Simulations
In this section I analyse through numerical simulations what are the
effects of a monetary policy shock in a standard DSGE model with
durable goods. Namely, I consider the model sketched in the pre-
vious section without a borrowing constraint, which collapses to a
simple representative agent model with durable goods. The shock
analysed consists in an increase in the policy rate.6
6In order to better compare our results to Sterk (2010), I calibrated the standard
deviation of the shock to 0.001.
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The empirical evidence7 suggests that after a monetary policy
tightening the short term interest rate increases and this brings about
a reduction in overall output. At the same time both consumption of
non durable and of durable goods decline, with investment in the
durable sector experiencing the strongest decline. Figure 3.1 shows
that when prices are flexible in the durable sector but sticky in the
non durable one some anomalies emerge.8
First of all, both durable services and investment in durable goods
move counter-ciclically and therefore co-move negatively with ag-
gregate consumption. Second, total output is barely affected by the
shock. This result is in line with what already highlighted by Barsky,
House, and Kimball (2007). In fact, the authors showed that under
some conditions if prices in the durable sector are flexible monetary
policy is neutral in the short run.
In figure 3.2, I vary the degree of price stickiness in the durable
sector. The average frequency of price adjustment in this sector is
crucial in determining the response of the model to the shock. In par-
ticular, notice that the introduction of price stickiness in the durable
sector makes the model behave as if all prices were sticky (another re-
sult documented in Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007)). Namely, the
co-movement problem is solved and durable consumption as well
as investment declines. Furthermore, notice that within the range of
price stickiness analysed, only in the case in which durable prices are
reset on average once every two quarters the policy rate increases on
impact as we would expect.
7There are several studies documenting through VAR analysis the response of
durable goods and consumption to monetary policy, see for example Bernanke and
Gertler (1995).
8Note that in line with both the empirical and theoretical literature on durable
goods and housing our measure of total output considers constant prices in the
durable sector. I also provide the alternative measure with flexible prices (var.
name Output (flex. prices)).
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Those preliminary simulations show that the representative agent
model with durable goods and sticky prices is strongly reliant on the
combination of price stickiness in the two sectors, hinting that some
amendments to this set up are needed if we want to take the presence
of durable goods seriously.
From an analytical point of view, the reason for the co-movement
problem is given, as explained by Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007),
by the quasi-constancy of the shadow value of durables. As already
mentioned, the shadow value of durables is:
Vt = qtU˜c,t = U˜d,t + γ(1− δ)Et{U˜c,t+1qt+1} (3.18)
Iterating forward the right hand side of this equation, Vt can be
rewritten as:
Vt = qtU˜c,t = Et{
∞∑
j=0
[β(1− δ)]jU˜d,t+j} (3.19)
The shadow value of durable goods is almost constant because
temporary shocks have a small effect on the utility derived from
durables, which is given by the stock of durables and not by its
flow. Equation (3.19) entails therefore that if Vt is almost constant,
any variation in the relative price of durables must be matched by
an opposite variation in the marginal utility of consumption. There-
fore, when prices are more sticky in the non-durable sector and qt
declines Ct must decrease (given that the marginal utility of con-
sumption must increase), while at the same time households have
an incentive to buy more housing given the drop in relative prices.
It is also interesting to notice what happens to the labor supply, which
can be rewritten as:
−U˜n,t = wt
qt
qtU˜c,t (3.20)
Consider the case with fully flexible durable prices. First, the real
wage in units of durables does not move, second, as showed above,
the shadow value of durables qtU˜c,t is almost constant, and therefore
total employment does not move and since labor is the only factor of
production this feeds directly into total output.
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3.2.3 The Model with Financial Frictions
In this section are reported the results of the full model, which nests
the representative agent one. In this model, credit markets are not
perfect since a fraction of households cannot consume as much as it
would. Indeed, credit is bound to the value of the stock of durables
in their possession. According to Monacelli (2009) the presence of
financial frictions goes in the direction of making DSGE models with
durable goods closer to empirical evidence on two grounds. First,
constrained borrowers are more sensitive to a monetary policy shock.9
Second, the model with financial frictions makes this class of models
less dependent on the price stickiness assumption. While the former
statement is correct, Sterk (2010) shows that the latter is not, and that
the presence of credit frictions make it even more complicated for a
model with durable goods to break the co-movement problem. The
simulation presented in this paper confirm Sterk’s findings.
Figure 3.3 shows how the model with financial frictions responds
after a monetary policy shock when durable goods prices are flexible
but sticky in the non durable sector10.
9Monacelli (2009) shows analytically that this is due to the change in the user
cost of borrowers.
10The figure mirrors the one in the previous section.
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FIGURE 3.3: Baseline calibration, response to a monetary policy tightening. Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year for the non durable
sector. Durable goods prices are flexible. The plotted multiplier of the constraint is ψ, namely the ratio of the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing
to the budget constraint.
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It is very interesting to notice that the co-movement problem is
broken down for borrowers for the same combination of price sticki-
ness used in the representative agent model. The shock brings about
a decline in the relative price of durables and this entails a tight-
ening in borrowers’ budget constraint since its value decreases. As
a result, both consumption and durable services fall for borrowers.
Durables fall by more on impact, because the user cost of durable
goods increases, entailing a substitution effect. However, for the
savers there is a positive income effect – which works in the oppo-
site direction of that experienced by borrowers– but considering that
savers are consumption smoother the increase in the real rate makes
them willing to substitute consumption intertemporally. Given the
reduction in the relative price of durables, savers increase their con-
sumption of durable services. On aggregate the co-movement prob-
lem is not solved, e.g. aggregate investment and consumption of
durable goods increase after a monetary policy shock. What is strik-
ing, is that financial frictions not only do not seem to solve the co-
movement problem on aggregate, but they also bring about a slight
increase in total output. As noted by Sterk (2010) a simple durable
model with financial frictions makes it even more complicated to
solve the co-movement problem. Figure 3.4, shows the impulse re-
sponses for different degrees of price stickiness.
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FIGURE 3.4: Baseline calibration, response to a monetary policy tightening. Plotted multiplier of the constraint is ψ, the ratio of the Lagrange
multiplier of the borrowing to the budget constraint.
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Differently from what argued by Monacelli (2009) the model seems
to be still very dependent on the degree of price stickiness in the two
sectors. In order to break down on aggregate the co-movement prob-
lem durable prices must be sticky. To say if the model with financial
frictions scores better than the representative agent model we need
to compare directly the IRFs of the two model. This is what I do in
the next subsection.
3.2.4 Comparing The Two Models
According to Monacelli (2009), the presence of financial frictions in
the form of a collateral constraint that binds borrowers helps the
model being less dependent on the combination of price stickiness to
deliver results that are consistent with the empirical literature featur-
ing durable goods. In this section I investigate if this is true by com-
paring the IRFs of the two models more closely. I take the stance that
in order for the model with financial frictions to be considered better
than the representative agent model in accounting for the empiri-
cal facts, it should break down the co-movement problem for more
combinations of price stickiness between the two sectors. I also in-
vestigate more in detail what is the effect of introducing financial
frictions both on consumption and on durable investment, for the
literature on the topic points at a magnification of monetary policy
shocks given by the presence of financial frictions.
Figure 3.5 compares the model with financial frictions and the
representative agent model for different combinations of price stick-
iness and it replicates Sterk (2010) findings. The first row shows the
case for an average frequency of price adjustment in the non-durable
sector of a year, while prices in the durable sector are flexible. Then,
in each row the degree of price stickiness in the non-durable sector is
kept constant while it increases in the durable one.
As it can be easily noticed, while aggregate consumption in the
model with financial frictions declines more on impact in all cases,
the decline of durable consumption and the stronger contraction in
investment in the representative agent model compensate for this de-
cline, bringing about a similar change in aggregate output in the two
models. One striking difference is the case with full price flexibility
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in the durable sector. Indeed, it cannot be concluded that the model
with financial frictions performs better than the representative agent
on, for total output in the frictions model actually goes up. This con-
tradicts Monacelli (2009)’s results by showing that financial frictions
do not amplify the effects of a monetary policy shock and make it
even more difficult to solve the co-movement problem. This point
was first noticed by Sterk (2010), who observed that the reduction in
borrowing by savers entitles them with more resources today, and
this in turn tends to offset the decline in consumption by borrowers.
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non durable sector, while price stickiness in the durable sector varies from the full flexible case to 1 year average frequency.
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Sterk (2010) provides an intuition on why the model with fric-
tions fails in breaking down the co-movement problem. As already
noticed, the shadow value of durable goods is not the same for bor-
rowers and savers. In particular, the one for constrained agents reads
as follows:
Vt = qtUc,t =
Ud,t + β(1− δ)EtVt+1
1− (1− χ)(1− δ)ψtpid,t+1 (3.21)
Equation (3.21) is positively correlated to ψt, the shadow value of
the borrowing constraint. According to Monacelli (2009) a tighten-
ing of the constraint, brings about an increase of Vt and therefore a
substitution effect from durables to non-durables. 11 What is impor-
tant in this analysis is that this smooths the tendency of households
to buy durables when their relative price declines. However, the nu-
merical simulations presented here showed that on aggregate output
increases under flexible durable goods prices. To see the reason for
this, consider the case of flexible durable prices and rewrite the total
labor supply condition as:
Nt = ωNt + (1− ω)N˜t = wt
qt
[ω
v
Vt +
(1− ω)
v˜
V˜t
]
(3.22)
it has already been pointed out how, under flexible durable prices,
the real wage in terms of durable goods is constant. Given that also
V˜t is almost constant, the increase in Vt brings about an increase in
total output.
This discussion suggests that more ingredients are needed in this
simple model. Particularly, altering the conditions of perfect compe-
tition in the labor market seems to be key to amend the inconsistency
of the model. The introduction of additional features is the aim of the
next sections.
3.2.5 Adding Habit Persistence in Consumption
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010) note that one of the ingredients that
helps delivering plausible results in a DSGE model with durable
11In all our numerical simulations Vt always increase, irrespective of the degree
of price stickiness considered in the durable sector. This holds true also when the
nominal rate is negative and ψt declines instead of increasing.
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goods is the introduction of habit persistence in consumption. In
particular, this feature helps in rendering the hump in consumption
observed in the data. The aim of this section is to lay-out the basis for
a model able to break the co-movement problem even when durable
good prices are flexible.
In order to introduce habit in consumption we need to consider
the following modification to the maximization problem solved in
the previous sections. The utility function now becomes:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log[(1− α)(Ct − hCt−1)
(η−1)
η + αD
(η−1)
η
t ]
η
(η−1) − v N
(1+ϕ)
t
(1 + ϕ)
)
,
(3.23)
with 0 < β < 1 and where h is the parameter governing the de-
gree of habits in consumption. Consequently, first order conditions
read as follows12:
−Un,t
λt
= wc (3.24)
λt = Uc,t − hβEt{Uc,t+1} (3.25)
qtλt = Ud,t+β(1−δ)Et{λt+1qt+1}+(1−χ)(1−δ)λtqtψtEt{pid,t+1} (3.26)
Rtψt = 1− βEt
{λt+1
λt
Rt
pit+1
}
(3.27)
Figure 3.6 shows the IRFs for some selected variables to a change
in the nominal policy rate for the model with financial frictions. As
in previous cases, the figure shows an average frequency of price
adjustment of one year for the non-durable sector, while prices are
flexible in the durable sector. Two results are worth noticing beside
the presence of a hump in total consumption. The first one is that the
introduction of habits in consumption, as we would expect, does not
solve the co-movement problem. The second one is that the stronger
12 I only rewrite the first order conditions for the borrower. The change, of
course, applies also for savers.
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is the decline in consumption, the stronger is the positive response
of durable investment, which suggests a substitution effects between
the two forms of consumption.
FIGURE 3.6: Baseline calibration, model with financial frictions, response to
a monetary policy tightening. Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year
for the non durable sector, while prices are flexible in the durable sector.
3.2.6 Adding Wage Stickiness
Adding wage stickiness in a model with durable goods fixes the co-
movement problem. This has been noted by Erceg and Levin (2006)
and by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010) among the others. In this section
it is shown the effect of introducing wage stickiness in a model with
durable goods, with and without financial frictions.
Wage stickiness is introduced and modeled in a way similar to
Kim and Oh (2014). The problem of the households in the presence
of wage stickiness resembles also that for firms briefly outlined in the
previous section. Households offer homogeneous labor services and
rely on unions to set their wages as a mark-up over their marginal
rate of substitution. Unions differentiate labor and set wages facing
adjustment costs à la Rotemberg:
ACw,t =
θw
2
(
Wt
Wt−1
− 1
)2
wt (3.28)
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where θw is the wage adjustment cost parameter13 and the wage
refers to a single household. Labor services are then reassembled by
labor packers that offer labor to goods producers. I assume that there
is a union for each households group and calibrate the two elasticity
of substitution between labor types, εw and ε˜w , in order to have a
mark-up of 20% in steady state. Solving the unions problem we get
the following first order conditions:
(3.29)
ϑw(pi
w
t − 1)piw = ϑwβEt
λt+1
λt
[
(piwt+1 − 1)piwt+1
wt+1
wt
]
+ (1− εw)Nt + εwMRStNt
wt
(3.30)
ϑ˜w(p˜i
w
t − 1)p˜iw = ϑ˜wγEt
λ˜t+1
λ˜t
[
(p˜iwt+1 − 1)p˜iwt+1
w˜t+1
w˜t
]
+ (1− ε˜w)N˜t + ε˜w ˜MRSt N˜t
w˜t
Notice that I assume borrowers and savers to be identical but for
their impatience, this also entails that they supply the same labor
types to unions and earn the same wage: wt = w˜t, which implies
that piwt = p˜iwt . Notice also, that when ϑw = ϑ˜w = 0, there are no ad-
justment costs in setting the wage and therefore the condition states
that the wage is set as a positive mark-up over the marginal rate of
substitutions of the two groups.
Several simulations considering different degrees of wage rigidi-
ties are considered. In the following figure, ϑw is set in order to ob-
tain an average frequency of wage adjustment of half a year for both
groups. In order to calibrate the two parameters I map ϑw and ϑ˜w to
get the same elasticity used in the Calvo model.14
13This specification of the problem implies that the adjustment cost parameter
for borrowers and savers is going to be different if we want to have the same fre-
quency of wage adjustment for the two households groups.
14In order to do so I compute ϑw as follows: ϑw = (εw − 1)θw(1 + εφ))/((1 −
θw)(1− βθw))
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FIGURE 3.7: Baseline calibration, response to a monetary policy tightening. Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year for the non durable
sector, while price stickiness in the durable sector varies from the full flexible case to 1 year average frequency. Habit in consumption parameter is:
h = 0.6. Wages are sticky on average for half a year.
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Interestingly, as already noted by Kim and Oh (2014), the intro-
duction of wage stickiness seems to solve the co-movement problem
for both specifications, irrespective of the combination of price stick-
iness in the two sectors. This holds true even if we consider a rela-
tively small degree of stickiness in the wage adjustment problem.15
The presence of financial frictions now has a strong effect on to-
tal output, durable goods investment dynamics and aggregate con-
sumption. Indeed, those variables reacts more strongly than in the
representative agent model, for any combination of price rigidities
considered. Therefore, financial frictions seem to play a role, but
the presence of wage rigidity is crucial. From an intuitive point of
view, the reason why durable investment collapses – bringing about
an overall strong contraction in output – is given by the fact that the
introduction of wage stickiness in the durable sector makes durable
prices sticky even if they are flexible, for labor is the only factor of
production for durables.
The introduction of wage stickiness seems not only to solve the
co-movement problem, but also to restore the importance of finan-
cial frictions. However, an issues seem to emerge, that is the strong
response in durable investment following a monetary policy shock.
The reaction of investment is the object of the following section, and
is a well known effect of wage stickiness, already highlighted among
the others by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010).
3.2.7 Adding Adjusting Costs of Durable Investment
As highlighted in the previous section, introducing wage rigidity
makes durable goods investment very sensitive to changes in the
policy rate. In order to overcome the problem, one solution is to
consider adjustment costs in durable investment.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010) introduce this friction by operating a
separation between the costs that firms face in adjusting the level of
15In sensitivity analysis different degrees of wage stickiness and non-durable
price stickiness are also considered. This result is in line with what already noticed
by Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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production and the costs firms face in changing the production level.
Those are given by the following expressions:
Costs adjusting the level = Ph,tφ1
Yh,ss
2
(
Yh,t − Yh,ss
Yh,ss
)2
(3.31)
Costs changing the production level = Ph,tφ2
Yh,ss
2
(
Yh,t − Yh,t−1
Yh,ss
)2
(3.32)
where the parameter φ1 and φ2 refer respectively to the cost of
changing the level of production, and to that of changing the pro-
duction level. Calibrating those parameters corresponds to finding
the short and long run elasticity of durable investment.16 Several
simulations using different values for those two parameters are per-
formed. For this exercise I consider the full model with an average
duration of price stickiness of one year for the non durable sector, the
same average duration for wages, whereas durable goods prices are
sticky. Erceg and Levin (2006) estimate that the response of durable
investment following a 100 basis point change in the nominal interest
rate on an annual base, is 10 times larger then that of consumption.
Figure 3.8 presents the results considering the main combinations
of long and short run elasticity proposed by Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2010)17. In all cases presented, durable investment is now not as
responsive as in the cases analysed in the previous section.
This section completes our exploration of the ingredients that can
be added to DSGE models with durable goods in order to amend the
co-movement problem and other documented implausible results.
In line with Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010) and Kim and Oh (2014) I
find that wage stickiness, and on a lower extent habit in consump-
tion and adjusting costs of investment, are important ingredients for
these models. The importance of those additional features however,
16See Appendix C for further details.
17Notice that the model presented here is different from the one proposed by
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010) and it considers the broad category of durables rather
than housing, entailing further differences also in calibration.
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FIGURE 3.8: Baseline calibration, response to a monetary policy tightening.
Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year for the non durable sector, while
prices are flexible in the durable sector. Wages are reset on average once a year
and the habits in consumption parameter is h = 0.6.
is not limited to the co-movement problem, but it is also instrumen-
tal for financial frictions in the form of collateral to play a role. In
the next section I report the results obtained using a variation of the
model proposed above and discuss another result related to the pres-
ence of financial frictions documented by the literature.
3.3 The Role of Financial Frictions
Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) documented both empirically
and by resorting to a DSGE model similar in spirit to the one used in
the previous sections, that economies characterized by higher loan to
value ratios and by flexible mortgage contract rates18 are more sen-
sitive to a monetary policy shock. In order to complete the analysis
undertaken with this work, the remainder of the paper is dedicated
to the study of the effect of a monetary policy shock by resorting to
the exact same model used in Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013).
18As in many other models discussed here, they explicitly refer to housing and
not to durable goods.
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This model is a variation of the one laid out in Monacelli (2009).
The difference is only given by the calibration, by the consideration
of habit persistence in consumption, and by the the labor market,
which is still perfectly competitive but more plausible, for it now al-
lows for four different labor supplies and wages. The maximization
problem of the borrower looks now as follows:
(3.33)
E0
∞∑
t =0
βt
(
log[(1− α)(Ct − hCt−1)
(η−1)
η + αD
(η−1)
η
t ]
η
(η−1)
− v N
(1+ϕ)
c,t
(1 + ϕ)
− v N
(1+ϕ)
d,t
(1 + ϕ)
)
,
with 0 < β < 1
Ct + qh,t(Dt − (1− δ)Dt−1) + Rt−1bt−1
pit
= bt + wc,tNc,t + wd,tNd,t + Tt
(3.34)
and the only first order condition that changes with respect to the
previous version of the model is, of course, the one related to labor19:
−Un,t
λc,t
=
Wi,t
Pc,t
for(i=c,d) (3.35)
Notice also that monetary policy is linear in the logs of inflation
and the nominal interest rate:
log
(
Rt
R¯
)
= φpi log
(
pii,t
p¯i
)
+ ξt (3.36)
and the shock evolves according to:
ξt = ρpiξt−1 + ut (3.37)
This specification of the policy rule allows to respond either to pic,
to pid or to a linear combination of the two. In Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca (2013) as well as in the simulations presented here pii,t = pic,t.
19Same applies to savers.
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TABLE 3.2: Calibrated Parameters
Param. Name Value Description
ϕ 1 Inverse elasticity of labor supply
γ 0.99 Discount factor saver
β 0.98 Discount factor borrower
δ 0.01/4 Depreciation rate durables
εc 7.5 Elas. subs. between non-durables
εd 7.5 Elas. subs. between durables
χ 0.4 Down-payment
φpi 1.5 Response to inflation in the Taylor Rule
ρpi 0.15 Shock persistence
ω 0.5 Share of borrowers
η 1 Elas. subs. durables and non-durables
α 0.16 Share of durables in the utility function
h 0.9 Habit parameter
In this section, the results for this model are presented by follow-
ing the same calibration (see Table 3.3) used in Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca (2013) and focusing only on differences in institutional fac-
tors which relate to the loan to value ratio. Namely, different time
structures in the mortgage contract are not taken into account.20
The results to a 25 basis points increase in the nominal policy rate
are presented in figure C.1 and 3.9. In the calibration considered, the
housing sector is characterized by price stickiness – one year average
duration of price – while prices are flexible in the durable sector.21
Beside simulating the model for the baseline calibration, the down-
payment rate is allowed to vary from a baseline of 0.4 to 0.25 and
to 0.15. This corresponds to an increase in the loan to value ratio,
which is equal to 1 minus the down-payment, and therefore the sec-
ond and third scenario can be interpreted as reproducing economies
with more developed capital markets and therefore more leveraged
20I do not consider the possibility for fixed-rate type mortgage contracts for it is
not instrumental to this analysis and its discussion is separated from the conclu-
sions related to the change in the down-payment.
21This is the exact same combination of price stickiness analysed by Calza,
Monacelli, and Stracca (2013).
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borrowers. The original model, proposed by Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca (2013) gets to the following results. The presence of a collat-
eral constraint makes borrowers more sensitive to a monetary policy
shock, along the lines to what has been shown in previous sections.
However, what is striking is that the authors not only show a decline
in consumption, but also a drop in housing investment and there-
fore in total output. This results is at odds with the results presented
here, for it can be obtained by simply considering habit in consump-
tion and a different specification for labor. In fact, many studies22
and this work so far, have shown that a simple model with durable
goods and flexible prices in that sector is subject to the co-movement
problem. Furthermore, this paper has also proven that, contrary to
what stated in Monacelli (2009), the introduction of financial frictions
in the form of a collateral constraint is not enough to overcome this
problem, while Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) argue that habits
in consumption and financial frictions are key to deliver their results.
A second important result documented by Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca (2013) empirically and validated by their model, is that in-
creasing the loan to value ratio magnifies the decline in both con-
sumption and housing investment, and therefor in total output. Fig-
ure 3.9 shows that this is actually not the case. Indeed, housing in-
vestment not only increases but it also increases more when the loan
to value ratio is larger. This, in turn, has an effect on the relative
price of housing and on total output, the former declining less as
the loan to value gets larger, while the latter increasing more. Those
results are not in line to what presented in Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca (2013) and revert the conclusion of the authors. However,
several studies that resorted in richer models than the one presented
in this section,23 confirmed that financial frictions, in the form here
presented make the economy more sensitive to a monetary policy
shock. Therefore, this work does not argue against the use of finan-
cial frictions in DSGE models, but against the fact that the results ob-
tained in Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013) can be obtained with
the model therein used.
22See also Iacoviello and Neri (2010) who confirm that wage rigidity (even just
sectoral) is needed to make residential investment sensitive to monetary policy.
23See for example the already cited Iacoviello and Neri (2010) or Iacoviello (2005)
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FIGURE 3.9: Baseline calibration, response to a monetary policy tightening.
Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year for the non durable sector, while
prices are flexible in the durable sector.
In order to account for the differences between the results hereby
presented and what maintained in Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013)
I show what influences the behavior of residential investment in this
model, following an argument similar to the one proposed in section
3.2.4.
Considering the specification of the production function, aggre-
gate investment is given by:
Naggd,t = (1− ω)(N˜d,t) + ωNd,t (3.38)
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The labor supply in the sector, respectively for borrowers and
savers, can be expressed as:
vNφd,t =
wd,t
qt
qtλt (3.39)
v˜N˜φd,t =
w˜d,t
qt
qtλ˜t (3.40)
In this model the shadow value of housing is given by Vt = qtλt
and V˜t = qtλ˜t, therefore equation (3.38) can be rewritten as:
Naggd,t = (1− ω)
(
w˜d,t
qt
V˜t
v˜
)
+ ω
(
wd,t
qt
Vt
v
)
(3.41)
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets, w˜d,t
qt
=
wd,t
qt
, therefore (3.42) simplifies to:
Naggd,t =
wd,t
qt
[
(1− ω)
v˜
V˜t +
ω
v
Vt
]
(3.42)
As also discussed in section 3.2.4, V˜t, savers’ shadow value of
housing, is quasi-constant, while wd,t
qt
is constant since I am consider-
ing perfectly flexible prices in the durable sector. A consequence of
this is that any increase in the shadow value of housing for borrow-
ers Vt is mirrored by an increase in housing investment. Remember
then, that the shadow value of borrowers differs from that of savers
for the presence of this component: 1− (1− χ)(1− δ)ψtpid,t+1 at the
denominator. A lower value of χ entails a higher loan to value ra-
tio and therefore a stronger increase in Vt in response to a shock that
tightens the borrowing constraint and therefore increases ψ. This ex-
plains the behavior of residential investment in figure 3.9.
It is interesting then to check whether the introduction of wage
stickiness, as well as adjustment costs in housing investment, in this
model is enough to restore the validity of the theoretical results in
Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2013). To do so this section considers
wage stickiness as presented in section 3.2.6 but as in Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) I allow for the presence of four different unions, one for
each group of household/sector. Figure 3.10 shows that the intro-
duction of wage stickiness solves the co-movement problem, as we
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would expect. Under nominal wage rigidity housing investment de-
clines while consumption and therefore total output, responds more
strongly in the case in which the loan to value ratio is higher. Notice
that even adding wage rigidities it is difficult to argue that housing
investment are more sensitive to a monetary policy shock when the
LTV ratio is higher.
FIGURE 3.10: Baseline calibration, response to a monetary policy tightening.
Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year for the non durable sector, while
prices are flexible in the durable sector. Average frequency of wage adjustment
equal to 1 year in both housing and consumption. Adjustment costs of housing
investment calibrated in order to have a short and long run elasticity: SR = 1
and LR = 3.
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper has briefly revisited the co-movement problem that arises
in DSGE models with durable goods. In doing so, it focused on the
role played by financial frictions in the form of a collateral constraint
tied to the value of borrowers’ stock of durable goods. Compar-
ing the models with and without financial frictions in the versions
presented in Monacelli (2009) and in Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca
(2013), it is possible to conclude that the departure from the repre-
sentative agent model does not seem to be a fruitful exercise if we
do not consider additional features. Indeed, the presence of financial
frictions in those set-ups makes it even more complicated to break
down the co-movement between durable and non-durable consump-
tion (at least when durable goods prices are flexible). Specifically, in
some combinations of price stickiness considered, the presence of fi-
nancial frictions goes in the opposite direction with respect to the
one pointed out by most of the literature. Furthermore, it has been
shown that increasing the loan to value ratio, and therefore the lever-
age of borrowers, is not detrimental for the economy when hit by a
monetary policy shock. In the simple models presented above, fi-
nancial frictions do not play the role highlighted by some literature
of amplifying the effect of a monetary policy shock to the economy.
Adding wage stickiness restores an active role for financial frictions
and helps reconciling theoretical with empirical evidence. Those re-
sults have two main implications. The first one is that nominal wage
stickiness seems to be more important than financial frictions, in the
form hereby presented, in breaking the co-movement problem and
bringing theoretical IRFs closer to what can be observed in the data.
The second implication is that conditional to the presence of wage
stickiness – or other features not explored here – financial frictions
play an important role in business cycle analysis.
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A.0.1 The log-normal distribution
We assume that ω is log-normally distributed. Under the assumption
that ln(ω¯) ∼ (−1
2
σ2, σ2), its expected value is: E(ω) = 1.
We define F (ω¯) and f(ω¯) respectively as the cumulative distribu-
tion function and the probability density function of the log-normal
variable ω¯. In particular, the economic meaning of F (ω¯) is that it
represents the share of defaulters and therefore we can alternatively
refer to it as the rate of default (RoD).
Instead of working with F and f , we work with Φ and φ, which
are the cumulative distribution function and the probability den-
sity function of the standard normal. This is possible because the
log-normal distribution can be related to the normal distribution by
defining the following variable:
(A.1)z =
ln(ω¯) + .5σ2
σ
and therefore:
(A.2)
Φ(z) ≡ F (ω¯)
≡ Φ
(
ln ω¯ − µ
σ
)
≡ Rate of default
Now, we can defined the variable G(ω) and Γ(ω) by making use
of our definition in (A.1):
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(A.3)
G(ω¯) ≡
∫ ω¯
0
ω f(ω)dω
≡ Φ
(
ln ω¯ − µ
σ
− σ
)
≡ Φ (z − σ)
(A.4)Γ(ω¯) ≡ ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω +G(ω¯)
≡ ω¯[1− Φ(z)] +G(ω¯)
Now we are ready to compute the first derivative with respect to
ω¯:
(A.5)G′(ω¯) =
φ(z − σ)
σω¯
while the derivative of Γ is:
(A.6)Γ′(ω¯) = 1− Φ(z)− φ(z)
σω¯
+
φ(z − σ)
σω¯
Finally, consider that as shown in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) the first and second derivative of the function:
(A.7)Γ(ω¯) ≡ ω¯
∫ ∞
ω¯
f(ω)dω∗ +
∫ ω¯
0
ω f(ω)dω
are:
(A.8)Γ′(ω¯) = 1− F (ω¯)
and
(A.9)Γ′′(ω¯) = −f(ω¯)
Implying that the gross return of the lender is increasing at a de-
creasing rate in the threshold level. This implies a higher loan to
value for a higher cutoff value and therefore a higher contractual rate
rk.
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A.0.2 Robustness checks - further IRFs
In this section we present further results and robustness checks.
The monetary policy shock is affected by the calibration of the pa-
rameters in the Taylor Rule, while the response after the shock of the
borrowers change with changes in the flexibility of the loan rates.
While qualitatively we confirm the results presented in the main sec-
tion, the following IRFs show that when the loan rate is flexible, the
relative stronger decline in loans and in housing consumption by
sub-primers becomes more evident.
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FIGURE A.1: A shock to the standard deviation of sub-primers’ idiosyncratic shock. All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from
steady state. Loan rates, rate of defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in levels.
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FIGURE A.2: 25 basis point increase in the policy rate. All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady state. Loan rates, rate of
defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in levels.
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FIGURE A.3: Flexible loan rate 25 basis point increase in the policy rate.
All variable are expressed as a percentage deviation from steady state. Loan
rates, rate of defaults, loan to values and banks’ leverage are instead in levels.
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A.0.3 Derivations
In the following sections we report some derivations and the maxi-
mization problem for savers and borrowers.
A.0.4 Savers
Savers’ budget constraint in nominal terms is:
(A.10)
C˜tPc,t + Ph,t[H˜t − H˜t−1(1− δ)] + D˜t
= D˜t−1(1 + r
f
t−1) +
∑
m
W˜m,tN˜m,t + Π
fi
t
The real budget constraint ((1.31)) is written as follows for we
divide the nominal budget constraint by Pc,t. In particular, notice that
real deposits are given by dt−1 = Dt−1/Pc,t−1 and the gross inflation
rate at time t is pit =
Pc,t
Pc,t−1
:
(A.11)C˜t + ph,t[H˜t − H˜t−1(1− δ)] + d˜t = d˜t−1(1 + r
d
t−1)
pit
+ w˜tN˜t + Π
fi
t
Consider a generic utility function, the agent derives utility from
consumption and housing and disutility from hours worked in the
two sectors m = (c, h):
(A.12)Et
[ ∞∑
t =0
βtsU(C˜t, H˜t, N˜c,t, N˜h,t)
]
Savers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (1.31) The
Lagrangian for the savers maximization problem is:
(A.13)
L = U(C˜t, H˜t, N˜c,t, N˜h,t)− λ˜t
(
C˜t + ph,t[H˜t − H˜t−1(1− δ)] + d˜t
− d˜t−1(1 + r
f
t−1)
pit
−
∑
m
W˜m,tN˜m,t − Πfit
)
The first order conditions of the problem are: with respect to Ct
(A.14)M˜U c,t = λ˜c,t
with respect to Ht
(A.15)λ˜c,tph,t = M˜Uh,t + β(1− δ)Et[ph,t+1λ˜t+1]
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Finally, the first order condition with respect to d˜t is given by:
(A.16)λ˜t = βs(1 + r
f
t )Et
(
λ˜t+1
pit+1
)
Note: assuming that unions set the wage on behalf of savers im-
plies that they do not maximize also with respect to the hours worked
in the two sectors.
A.0.5 Borrowers Loan to Value
In this section we show how to derive borrowers loan to value. We
refer to a sub-primer but nothing differs for the primer.
Plug:
(A.17)ω¯s−pt+1H
s−p
t Ph,t+1(1− δ) = Ls−pt (1 + rk,s−pt+1 )
into the participation constraint to get rid of rkt :
(A.18)
(1 + rlt)L
s−p
t =
∫ ω¯s−pt+1
0
ωs−pt+1 (1− µ)(1− δ)Ph,t+1Hs−pt ft+1(ω) dω
+
∫ ∞
ω¯s−pt+1
ω¯s−pt+1H
s−p
t Ph,t+1(1− δ)ft+1(ω) dω
from the definitions of Gt(ω¯
s−p
t+1 ) and Γt(ω¯
s−p
t+1 ) we know that:
(A.19)
∫ ω¯s−pt+1
0
ωs−pt+1 ft(ω) = Gt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )
and that:
(A.20)+
∫ ∞
ω¯s−pt+1
ω¯s−pt+1 ft(ω) dω = Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )−Gt(ω¯s−pt+1 )
we get that:
(1+rlt)L
s−p
t = Gt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )(1−δ)Ph,t+1Hs−pt −µGt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )(1−δ)Ph,t+1Hs−pt
+ Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )H
s−p
t Ph,t+1(1− δ)−Gt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )Hs−pt Ph,t+1(1− δ)
(A.21)
which eventually leads to:
(A.22)(1 + rlt)L
s−p
t = [Γt+1(ω¯
s−p
t+1 )− µGt+1(ω¯s−pt+1 )](1− δ)Ph,t+1Hs−pt
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A.0.6 Borrowers Budget Constraint
Also in this section we consider the problem of a sub-primer but the
solution method can be extended also to primers. From the bud-
get constraint with rk to the one expressed with the predetermined
interest rate rl in the borrower’s problem: In order to simplify the
exposition we write the parts of the budget constraint which deserve
a closer scrutiny, for the agency problem of borrowers has an impact
on the,. The elements of the nominal budget constraint we are inter-
ested in are:
(A.23)Lt−1(1 + rkt )[1− Ft(ω¯t)] = (1− δ)[1−Gt(ω¯t)]Ph,tHt−1
In the following passages we show how we get from the nominal
budget constraint to the final result:
(A.24)Lt−1(1 + r
f
t−1) = [1− µG(ω¯t)](1− δ)Ph,tHt−1]
Note that in the budget constraint used in the computation the
contractual rate rkt does not appear anymore, while we can define
the problem in terms of the risk free loan rate: rlt−1.
Using equation (1.3) defined at time t and pluggin it into (A.23)
we get:
(A.25)ω¯tHt−1Ph,t(1− δ) = Lt−1(1 + rkt )
(A.23) then becomes:
(A.26)ω¯tHt−1Ph,t(1− δ)[1− Ft(ω¯t)] = (1− δ)[1−Gt(ω¯t)]Ph,tHt−1
which is
(A.27)(1− δ)Ph,tHt−1[ω¯t[1− Ft(ω¯t)] +Gt(ω¯t)− 1] = 0
we know that:
(A.28)Γt(ω¯t) ≡ ω¯t
∫ ∞
ω¯t
ft(ω)dω +Gt(ω¯t)
and that:
(A.29)[1− Ft(ω¯t)] ≡
∫ ∞
ω¯t
ft(ω)dω
therefore (A.27) becomes:
(A.30)(1− δ)Ph,tHt−1[Γt(ω¯t)− 1] = 0
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Now, we know that the loan to value can be rewritten in terms of
Γ:
(A.31)Γt(ω¯t)Ph,tHt−1(1− δ) = (1+ rlt−1)Lt−1 +µGt(ω¯t)(1− δ)Ph,tHt−1
and therefore we can substitute this into (A.30):
(A.32)(1 + rlt−1)Lt−1 + µGt(ω¯t)(1− δ)Ph,tHt−1 − (1− δ)Ph,tHt−1 = 0
rearranging we get:
(A.33)(1 + rlt−1)Lt−1 = (1− µGt(ω¯t))[(1− δ)Ph,tHt−1]
which is exactly the way those elements enter into the budget
constraint.
A.0.7 Borrowers maximization problem
This section shows how to derive the first order conditions for any
given borrower b = (s−p, p). To be more general we derive the
problem by making explicit the presence of the stigma component,
namely we show the maximization problem by making explicit the
right hand side of the following equation: ω¯b,pt+1 = ω¯
p
t+1 + stigmab:
Borrowers maximize utility:
(A.34)Et
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtbU(C
b
t , H
b
t , N
b
c,t, N
b
h,t)
]
subject to the budget constraint and the participation constraint:
(A.35)
Cbt + ph,tH
b
t + l
b
t−1(1 + r
l
t−1) = l
b
t + (1− δ)[1−µGt(ω¯bt )]ph,tHbt−1
+
∑
m
wbm,tN
b
m,t
(A.36)(1 + r
f
t )l
b
t = [Γt+1(ω¯
b
t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯bt+1)
+ [1− Ft+1(ω¯bt+1)](stigmab)](1− δ)ph,t+1Hbtpit+1
Now, consider that Γ(ω¯b) is given by:
(A.37)Γt(ω¯bt ) ≡ ω¯t
∫ ∞
ω¯bt
ft(ω
b)dωb +Gt(ω¯
b
t )
we can write down the Lagrangian for the problem1:
1We only report the part of the Lagrangian which is of interest for the maxi-
mization problem.
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(A.38)L = U(Cbt , Hbt , N bc,t, N bh,t)− λbt
(
Cbt + ph,tH
b
t +
lbt−1
pit
(1 + rft−1)
− lbt − (1− δ)[1− µGt(ω¯bt )]ph,tHbt−1 −
∑
m
wbm,tN
b
m,t
)
− Etλbt+1βb
(
Cbt+1 + ph,t+1H
b
t+1 +
lbt
pit+1
(1 + rft )− lbt+1
− (1− δ)[1− µGt+1(ω¯bt+1)]ph,t+1Hbt −
∑
m
wbm,t+1N
b
m,t+1
)
− γbt+1
(
[(1 + rft )l
b
t
−[Γt+1(ω¯bt+1)−µGt+1(ω¯bt+1)+[1−Ft+1(ω¯bt+1)](stigmab)](1−δ)ph,t+1Hbtpit+1
)
The first order conditions with respect to Cbt , Hbt , lt and ω¯bt+1 are:
(A.39)MU bc,t − λbt = 0
MUh,t = λ
b
tph,t
− (1− δ)βbEt{(1− µGt+1(ω¯bt+1))λbt+1ph,t+1 + γbt+1[Γt+1(ω¯bt+1)
− µGt+1(ω¯bt+1) + [1− Ft+1](ω¯bt+1)(stigmab)]ph,t+1pit+1}
(A.40)
(A.41)λbt − (1 + rlt)Et
[
λbt+1
pit+1
βb + γ
b
t+1
]
= 0
(A.42)
−λbt+1βb(1− δ)ph,t+1HbtµG′t+1(ω¯bt+1)
+ (1− δ)ph,t+1Hbtpit+1γbt+1[Γ′t+1(ω¯bt+1)
− µG′t+1(ω¯bt+1)− ft+1(ω¯bt+1)(stigmab)] = 0
which, dividing by (1− δ)ph,t+1Hbt can be rewritten as:
(A.43)−λ
b
t+1βbµG
′
t+1(ω¯
b
t+1) + γ
b
t+1[Γ
′
t+1(ω¯
b
t+1)
− µG′t+1(ω¯bt+1)− ft+1(ω¯bt+1)(stigmab)]pit+1 = 0
Notice that in the .mod file the problem looks slightly different.
Borrowers find the optimal threshold ω¯, that already takes into ac-
count the presence of the stigma component, therefore in the loan to
value we do not consider the stigma again because it would duplicate
its effect, for it is already included in the threshold identified by the
borrowers. In a few words, one can consider the participation con-
straint for the borrowers as including the stigma, but the true loan to
value ratio does not take the stigma into account, therefore the part
related to it in equation (A.36) drops out.
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A.0.8 Parametrization - Utility Functions
We follow the majority of the literature on DSGE with housing in
considering the following utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtı
(
ln Xt − ζι
∑
m=c,h
N
(1+η)
m,t
(1 + η)
)
, with ı = (b, s) 0 < βı < 1
(A.44)
where we consider Xt as an index of housing and non-durable
goods:
(A.45)Xt =
[
[(1− α)(Ct − bhCt−1)
(χ−1)
χ + αH
(χ−1)
χ
t ]
χ
(χ−1)
]
The parameter η is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor sup-
ply and ζι a parameter measuring the weight of labor in the utility
function.
The parameter α represents the share of housing in the consump-
tion index and χ is the elasticity of substitution between consump-
tion and housing, the parameter bh allows us to introduce external
habit in consumption and Ct−1 represents aggregate consumption in
period t− 1. As χ→ 1 the index takes the form of a Cobb-Douglas:
(A.46)Xt =
[
[(Ct − bhCt−1)(1−α)Hαt
]
Given the presence of the logarithmic function, the utility func-
tion becomes separable in housing and consumption.
(A.47)E0
∞∑
t =0
βtς
(
(1−α) ln(Ct− bhCt−1) +α lnHt− ζ
∑
m=c,h
N
(1+η)
m,t
(1 + η)
)
,
Considering (A.47) the marginal utility of consumption is given
by:
(A.48)MUc,t =
(1− α)
(Ct − bhCt−1)
(A.49)MUh,t =
α
Ht
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B.0.1 Robustness Checks
In this section I show how the model dynamics change when I al-
low changes in the parameter measuring the response of monetary
authorities to inflation, γpi, and the sensitivity of taxes to public ex-
penditure φg. Figure B.1 clearly shows how the multiplier is affected
by the stance of monetary policy. Indeed, the lower is the reaction
of the policy rate to an increase in inflation the higher is the level
of the multiplier. Another parameter that influences the magnitudes
quite strongly is the sensitivity of taxes to public expenditure φg. The
quantitative results of the model are affected by how strongly the
shock is deficit financed (figure B.2).
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FIGURE B.1: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
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FIGURE B.2: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure
146 Appendix B. Appendix for Chapter II
B.0.2 Wage Rigidities
I model wage rigidities in a way that is similar to the canonical way
price rigidities are introduced on the firms side. In particular, wage
rigidities is due to unions’ monopolistic power and to adjustment
costs à la Rotemberg:
ACw,t =
θw
2
(
Wt
Wt−1
− 1
)2
wt (B.1)
the modellization is similar to the one used in Iacoviello and Neri
(2010), but the use of Rotemberg costs of adjustment makes it closer
to Kim and Oh (2014).
All households groups offer homogeneous labor services to unions
that differentiate labor and set their wages as a mark-up over their
marginal rate of substitution. Labor services are then reassembled
by labor packers that offer labor to goods producers. Solving the
unions problem we get the following four conditions, two for each
households’group:
w˜c,t
w˜c,t−1
θ˜wc
(
w˜c,t
w˜c,t−1
− 1
)
= θwc
γ λ˜t+1
λ˜t
w˜c,t+1
w˜c,t
w˜c,t+1
w˜c,t
(
w˜c,t+1
w˜c,t
− 1
)
+ (1− εwc) N˜c,t
+ N˜c,t
εwc
w˜c,t
v˜ N˜ φ˜c,t
(
N˜
(1+φ˜)
c,t + N˜
(1+φ˜)
d,t
) ξ˜−φ˜
1+φ˜
λ˜t
(
1− τ lt
)
(B.2)
w˜d,t
w˜d,t−1
θ˜wc
(
w˜d,t
w˜d,t−1
− 1
)
= θwc
γ λ˜t+1
λ˜t
w˜d,t+1
w˜d,t
w˜d,t+1
w˜d,t
(
w˜d,t+1
w˜d,t
− 1
)
+ (1− εwd) N˜d,t
+ N˜d,t
εwd
w˜d,t
(
N˜
(1+φ˜)
c,t + N˜
(1+φ˜)
d,t
) ξ˜−φ˜
1+φ˜
v˜ N˜ φ˜d,t
λ˜t
(
1− τ lt
)
(B.3)
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wc,t
wc,t−1
θwd
(
wc,t
wc,t−1
− 1
)
= θwd
β λt+1
λt
wc,t+1
wc,t
wc,t+1
wc,t
(
wc,t+1
wc,t
− 1
)
+ (1− εwc) Nc,t
+Nc,t
εwc
wc,t
v Nφc,t
(
N
(1+φ)
c,t +N
(1+φ
d,t )
) ξ−φ
1+φ(
1− τ lt
)
λt
(B.4)
wd,t
wd,t−1
θwd
(
wd,t
wd,t−1
− 1
)
= θwd
β λt+1
λt
wd,t+1
wd,t
wd,t+1
wd,t
(
wd,t+1
wd,t
− 1
)
+ (1− εwd) Nd,t
+Nd,t
εwd
wd,t
(
N
(1+φ)
c,t +N
(1+φ)
d,t
) ξ−φ
1+φ
v Nφd,t(
1− τ lt
)
λt
(B.5)
The parameters θwc, θwd, θ˜wc and θ˜wd are set in order to obtain an
average frequency of wage adjustment of half a year for both groups.
This specification of the problem implies that the adjustment cost pa-
rameter for borrowers and savers is going to be different if we want
to have the same frequency of wage adjustment for the two house-
holds groups because households are characterized by different dis-
count factors. This modellization of the labor sector makes our work
easier for it entails that households work the same amount of hours
in steady states and earn the same real wage.
B.0.3 First order conditions and other definitions
The optimization problem of firms results also in the following first
order conditions:
(B.6)mcct =
w˜ct N˜
c
t
Y ct (1− µc)
(B.7)mcct =
wct N
c
t
Y ct (1− µc)
(B.8)mcdt =
N˜dt w˜
d
t
Y dt (1−µh)
qt
(B.9)mcdt =
Ndt w
d
t
Y dt (1−µh)
qt
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(B.10)mcct =
Kt−1Rkt
Y ct µc
(B.11)mcdt =
Kdt−1R
kdt
Y dt µh
qt
(B.12)
qt
qt−1
=
pidt
pict
The adjustment cost of capital is given by:
(B.13)φt =
φkc
2
(
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
)2
Kt−1
φkd
2
(
Kd,t
Kd,t−1
− 1
)2
Kd,t−1
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B.0.4 Additional IRFs
Figures B.3 and B.4 replicate the IRFs in figure 1 and 2 and 5 by using
the same fiscal rule as in Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
FIGURE B.3: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure.
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FIGURE B.4: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure.
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FIGURE B.5: Response to a 1% increase in government expenditure for different LTV ratios, the fiscal rule used in this figure is the one used in
Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
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The following figures show the IRFs for a reduction in the con-
sumption tax, in the tax on bonds, and in the tax on housing.
FIGURE B.6: Response to a 1% decrease in the consumption tax.
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FIGURE B.7: Response to a 1% decrease in the consumption tax.
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FIGURE B.8: Response to a 1% decrease in the bond tax.
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FIGURE B.9: Response to a 1% decrease in the bond tax.
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FIGURE B.10: Response to a 1% decrease in the tax on housing.
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FIGURE B.11: Response to a 1% decrease in the tax on housing.
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Appendix for Chapter III
C.0.1 Further IRFs
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FIGURE C.1: Baseline calibration, response to a 25 basis points increase in the policy rate. Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year for the
non durable sector, while prices are flexible in the durable sector.
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FIGURE C.2: Baseline calibration, response to a 25 basis points increase in the policy rate. Average frequency of price adjustment 1 year for
the non durable sector, while prices are flexible in the durable sector. Average frequency of wage adjustment equal to 1 year in both housing and
consumption. Adjustment costs of housing investment calibrated in order to have a short and long run elasticity: SR = 1 and LR = 3.
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C.0.2 Adjusting Costs of Investment
The first order condition to the profit maximization problem of firms
is:
γφ2(yt+1 − yt)− φ2(yt − yt−1)− φ1yt +
(
Pd,t −Wt
Pd,t
)
= 0 (C.1)
where the last expression in round brackets is the mark-up m.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (2010), it can be argued that if m is
exogenous to the firm, the solution of the difference equation above
is:
yt = α1yt−1 + α2mt (C.2)
In this expression, α2 represents the short-run elasticity, while the
long-run elasticity is given by:
LR =
α2
(1− α1) =
1
φ1
(C.3)
SR = α2 (C.4)
Having targeted a given value for the short and long-run elastic-
ity, it is possible to back out the values for φ1 and φ2.
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